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Preface 
The primary goal of the ILO is to contribute, with member States, to achieve 
full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and 
young people, a goal embedded in the ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair 
Globalization (2008),
1
 and which has now been widely adopted by the international 
community. The integrated approach to do this was further reaffirmed by the 2010 
Resolution concerning employment policies for social justice and a fair 
globalization.
2  
 
In order to support member States and the social partners to reach this goal, the 
ILO pursues a Decent Work Agenda which comprises four interrelated areas: 
Respect for fundamental worker’s rights and international labour standards, 
employment promotion, social protection and social dialogue. Explanations and 
elaborations of this integrated approach and related challenges are contained in a 
number of key documents: in those explaining the concept of decent work,
3
 in the 
Employment Policy Convention, 1964 (No. 122), in the Global Employment Agenda 
and, as applied to crisis response, in the Global Jobs Pact adopted by the 2009 
International Labour Conference in the aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis. 
The Employment Sector is fully engaged in supporting countries placing 
employment at the centre of their economic and social policies, using these 
complementary frameworks, and is doing so through a large range of technical 
support and capacity building activities, policy advisory services and policy 
research. As part of its research and publications programme, the Employment 
Sector promotes knowledge-generation around key policy issues and topics 
conforming to the core elements of the Global Employment Agenda and the Decent 
Work Agenda. The Sector’s publications consist of books, monographs, working 
papers, employment reports and policy briefs. 
The Employment Working Papers series is designed to disseminate the main 
findings of research initiatives undertaken by the various departments and 
programmes of the Sector. The working papers are intended to encourage exchange 
of ideas and to stimulate debate. The views expressed are the responsibility of the 
author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the 
ILO. 
 
JoséManuel Salazar-Xirinachs 
Executive Director 
Employment Sector 
 
1 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/download/dg_announce_en.pdf. 
2 See http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2010/110B09_108_engl.pdf.   
3 See the successive Reports of the Director-General to the International Labour 
Conference: Decent work (1999); Reducing the decent work deficit: A global challenge 
(2001); Working out of poverty (2003).   
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Foreword 
One of the key features of the labour market developments observed during the 
past decades throughout the world relates to a phenomenon of labour market 
segmentation, e.g. the division of the labour market into separate submarkets or 
segments, distinguished by different characteristics and behavioural rules. To a large 
extent, these attributes depend on the specific environment in which workers operate. 
Segmentation may arise from particularities of labour market institutions, such as 
contractual arrangements (permanent versus temporary employment), their 
enforcement (and the resulting informality), as well as types of workers concerned 
(such as migrant, domestic, or dispatch workers).  
While the phenomenon is not new, the job crisis has brought an increasing 
attention to the segmentation/duality issue, especially in Europe. The implications 
and costs of segmentation are multiple, in both economic and social terms: they 
include wage gaps between segments, differences in access to training and social 
security, as well as in working conditions or tenure. Moreover, segmentation implies 
limited transitions to better jobs. The consequences of segmentation also have 
macroeconomic implications, such as lower productivity and higher employment 
volatility.  
In this context, and as part of its objective of promoting decent work, the ILO 
launched, in 2012, a research programme to better understand how labour market 
institutions affect employment outcomes in both quantitative and qualitative terms. 
One of the main motivations of the research project is to put job quality at the 
forefront of the policy debates, informing the main stakeholders in the world of work 
of the extent of labour market segmentation and its implications for job quality in 
selected countries. Fourteen country studies on labour market segmentation and job 
quality were provided by external country experts, as well as thematic papers on job 
quality in segmented labour markets and the role of labour law, collective 
bargaining, and improved enforcement. These studies were discussed in a scientific 
Workshop held at the ILO in December 2012 and used as thematic inputs in a 
policy-oriented Workshop held at the ILO in April 2013. 
The current paper is one in the series of such country studies. It makes an 
important contribution to the discussion on contractual segmentation of labour 
markets, providing an overview of the institutional setup as well as empirical 
evidence on the extent of segmentation and its implications for various aspects of job 
quality. The paper also offers a policy perspective on the ways to alleviate the 
negative consequences of segmentation.  
  
 
Sandrine Cazes, Corinne Vargha, 
Chief of Industrial and Employment 
Employment Analysis and Research Unit Relations Department 
Economic and Labour Market Analysis 
Department 
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1. Introduction4 
The main form of flexible employment in Spain is temporary contracts. In 
1984, when a legal change was introduced to allow their use (in particular, the so-
called temporary contract for employment promotion, TCEP) for any type of job, 
including the performance of permanent tasks, the ‘causality principle’ was broken 
(this legal principle states that the firm can only hire workers using open-ended 
contracts for permanent tasks and should use fixed-term contracts for temporary 
needs). This break was considered as transitory and exclusively justified by the poor 
economic outcomes of the Spanish labour market at that historical moment. 
However, it remained until 1994. Although the causality principle was formally 
restated, firms had learnt to use temporary contracts as an easy and swift way to 
adapt to business cycle changes and preferred to keep on using other forms of 
temporary contracts (as the per-task or the eventual contracts) when the TCEP was 
abolished, circumventing legal regulation modifications. The model of ‘flexibility at 
the margin’ hinged on a dual economic structure between jobs prone to stability and 
jobs prone to instability. The introduction and wide use of temporary contracts 
probably helped reinforce such structure, creating incentives for the segmentation of 
jobs, especially in large firms. Therefore, employers intensified the adaptation of 
their whole production process to the existence of a group of workers in low-paid, 
high-rotation jobs, hired through temporary contracts, while using open-ended 
contracts for high-paid, low-rotation jobs. 
The consequence was that the share of temporary employment increased 
quickly during the 1980s to reach about one third of the wage and salary workers at 
the early-1990s, remaining at that level until the beginning of the current economic 
crisis. As the 1984 reform was one implemented at the margin, temporary contracts 
affected younger workers (in particular, women) in the first instance, as they were 
new comers to the labour market. However, it also affected low-skilled workers in 
the medium- and long-term, as they usually work in positions less stable and more 
exposed to turnover than high-skilled workers. 
Moreover, temporary contracts became the entry port for almost any 
occupation, bringing about a sort of probationary period more and more extended. 
Nevertheless, differences by education/skills are huge: for the ones with university 
degree or in white-collar high-skilled jobs temporary employment is a transitory 
period in their working lives (although this period may last until they are 30-35 year-
old), but for the ones with the lowest level of education or in blue-collar low-skilled 
positions temporary employment are the stuff that their working lives are made of. 
Therefore, the introduction and extensive use of temporary contracts seems to have 
reinforced the segmentation of jobs bringing about a separation between (roughly) 
two groups of workers who enjoy different degrees of stability and working 
conditions. This segmentation has had potential implications on many other micro- 
and macroeconomic issues, such as training, accidents, wages, productivity and even 
childbearing and the formation of new families. Then, although other sorts of 
segmentation exist in the Spanish labour market (by age, educational level and skills, 
for instance), all of them are subsumed into the segmentation by contract type 
 
4
 Carlos Garcia-Serrano is Senior Lecturer in Economics at the Universidad de Alcalá in 
Madrid. 
Miguel A. Malo is Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Salamanca, is 
Senior economist at IILS (International Institute for Labour Studies), ILO Geneva. 
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(temporary versus open-ended). This is the rationale for the exclusive focus of our 
analysis on the segmentation by contract arrangement. 
Different labour market reforms have been implemented to fight against this 
segmentation and the social dialogue between the main trade unions and employers’ 
organizations has tried to implement different measures to mitigate it (for instance, 
easing open-ended contracts with financial incentives). Although some small 
impacts have been perceived (in the private sector) in the last 15 years, segmentation 
and their negative consequences on some groups of workers remain. Finally, the two 
most recent reforms launched in 2010 and 2012 (after unsuccessful negotiations 
between trade unions and employers’ organizations) have tried to close the gap in 
firing costs between temporary and open-ended contracts and to promote ‘internal’ 
instead of ‘external’ flexibility in firms. 
 
2. Main characteristics of the National Labour Market 
Spain has experienced dramatic changes in its main labour market indicators 
during the last three decades. The mid-1990s was the beginning of a positive phase 
of the business cycle. As a general trend, the unemployment rate fell until the early-
2000s, remained rather stable several years and then underwent an additional decline 
until 2007 (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1   Unemployment rate by gender   
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Source: Labour Force Survey. 
The reduction in the period 1996-2007 was from nearly 23 per cent to 8 per 
cent. Therefore, Spain began this period suffering one of the highest unemployment 
rates in Europe and ended (just before the Great Recession) with an unemployment 
rate that was on the average of the European Union. Moreover, the reduction of the 
unemployment rate in 1996-2007 was hand in hand with a huge increase in the 
employment rate: from nearly 40 per cent to 54 per cent (see Figure 2). Therefore, 
 3 
the fall in the unemployment rate was closely linked to increases in employment 
levels and not to transitions from unemployment towards inactivity. In fact, outflows 
from unemployment to employment, which declined at the beginning of the 2000s 
and remained more or less stable in 2002-2004, increased in the period 2004-2007, 
while exits to out-of-the-labour force did not show a specific trend. 
 
Figure 2   Employment rate by gender  
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Source: Labour Force Survey. 
However, two successive shocks (the end of the speculative bubble in the 
autumn-winter of 2007 and the Lehman bankruptcy in the summer-autumn of 2008) 
heavily affected the Spanish economy in terms of the labour market outcomes. No 
only the employment rate decreased intensely at the beginning of the current 
recession (around 6 pp in less than three years) but the unemployment rate increased 
rapidly (it sky rocketed again above 20 per cent in 2010). Poor macroeconomic 
performance in the following years (2010-2012) has contributed to deepen this 
extremely bad behaviour of the Spanish labour market (the employment rate 
declined further 4 pp and the unemployment rate increased almost 6 pp). 
The overall evolution of the labour market hides substantial differences among 
different groups of workers. The decline in the unemployment rates in 1996-2007 
ranged from 30 to 10 per cent for women and from 18 to 6 per cent for men, from 
around 40 to 15 per cent for those aged 20-24 and from 11 to nearly 5 per cent for 
those aged 55 or more. At the same time, the employment rate increased 
substantially, in particular for some categories of workers: from 26 to 44 per cent for 
women (53 to 65 per cent for men), from 36 to nearly 60 per cent for those aged 20-
24 (14 to 19 per cent for those aged 55 or more), from 52 to 65 per cent for people 
 4 
with a post-compulsory secondary degree (it declined 2 pp for people with primary 
studies or less).
5
  
The recession in Spain has incorporated an idiosyncratic shock related to the 
end of a speculative bubble affecting the household prices and associated with the 
construction sector. Therefore, the groups whose employment is more related to this 
sector have been the most hardly hit in terms of unemployment increases. Since 
employment in construction is mainly male and its expansion has been associated 
with the large inflows of immigration starting in the mid-1990s, the collapse of the 
construction sector has resulted in a sharp and strong worsening of labour market 
indicators for (young) men, foreign-born people and low-skilled workers. The 
employment rate declined nearly 16 pp for men (less than 5 pp for women), nearly 
36 pp for men aged 20-24 (women aged 55 or more have increased their 
employment rate), almost 20 pp for foreign workers (9 pp for Spanish workers) and 
nearly 17 pp for people with compulsory secondary (less than 9 for those with a 
university degree). At the same time, the unemployment rate increased 50 pp for 
men aged 16-19 and 40 pp for men aged 20-24, 25 pp for foreign-born workers and 
29 pp for people with primary studies or less. 
One indication of the impact of the evolution of the building sector on the 
labour market performance is that some categories of occupations related to this 
sector concentrated the largest increases (declines) in employment in the period 
1996-2007 (2007-2010) (García-Serrano, 2011). The consequence of this change is 
clearly visible on the employment and unemployment rates of male and young low-
skilled workers. This evolution has made, for instance, that nowadays the traditional 
gap in the unemployment rate by gender against women has become almost non 
existent. 
A side effect of the intense and prolonged recession has been a large increase of 
long-term unemployment. Although cross-section survey data is not a properly 
source to calculate the complete duration of the spells of joblessness and the 
incidence of long-term unemployment, it is conventional to use the proportion of 
unemployed workers who have been looking for a job for one year or more as a 
standard measure of that incidence. In the case of Spain (see Figure 3), this 
proportion declined continuously during the economic expansion starting in the 
second half of the 1990s (with the exception of 2002-2003, as a consequence of the 
des-acceleration in 2001-2003). With the development of the current economic 
crisis, it increased rapidly from 20 per cent in 2008 to more than 50 per cent in 2012. 
At the same time, the gap against women closed in these years (in the past it was 
around 10 pp). 
 
5
 The figures concerning educational levels refer to the period 2000-2007, since the way the 
Spanish Labour Force Survey collected the highest attained level of education changed in 
2000, avoiding the availability of fully homogenous series when considering some 
disaggregation of educational levels. 
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Figure 3   Share of long-term unemployment by gender  
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Source: Labour Force Survey. 
Finally, regarding non-regular forms of employment, it can be said that the 
most important form of flexible employment in Spain is temporary contracts. Since 
they were allowed to be used by all economic sectors without any restriction in the 
period 1984-1994 as a means to foster employment and provide flexibility to firms, 
and in spite of successive reforms aimed at reducing the share of temporary 
employment, they rapidly became and have remained the preferred way of flexibility 
for firms. Neither part-time work nor self-employment has played a significant role 
in this area. For instance, the share of part‐time workers among wage and salary 
workers has remained rather low (even in the case of women, by European 
standards): around 6 per cent in 1996-2005 and 12‐13 per cent in 2005-2008, with a 
smooth increase in 2009-2012 (see Figure 4).
6
 In fact, as we shall examine later, the 
extended use of temporary contracts has brought about (or at least has helped to 
increase) the segmentation of jobs, since it has influenced the organization of jobs at 
firm level. 
 
6
 The share of part-time workers (the proportion of workers working less than 35 hours per 
week respect to the total of wage and salaried workers) increased in 2005 but this was due to 
the effects of a methodological change carried out in the Spanish Labour Force Survey. 
Moreover, the slight increase observed in the recent past (between 2009 and 2012) is 
probably related to the impact of policies implemented to foster this type of employment 
amidst the current recession. 
 6 
Figure 4   Share of part-time and temporary employment by gender  
0,0
5,0
10,0
15,0
20,0
25,0
30,0
35,0
40,0
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Temporary employment - All 
Temporary employment - Men
Temporary employment -Women
Part-time employment - All
Part-time employment - Men
Part-time employment - Women
 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
 
After the change in the Workers’ Charter in 1984 that allowed firms to use 
temporary contracts even for permanent needs, the share of temporary employment 
(the proportion of workers with a temporary or short‐term contract respect to the 
total of wage and salaried workers) increased rapidly and remained very high: since 
the early-1990s until the late-2000s almost one out of three wage and salary workers 
had a temporary contract (see Figure 4). The use of temporary contracts is not 
restricted to economic sectors affected by seasonality: not only in seasonal (as the 
tourism industry or agriculture) but also in non-seasonal economic activities 
temporary contracts are much more used than in other countries (Toharia, 2005; 
Felgueroso and Jiménez, 2010). In the last twenty years, the share of temporary 
employment has declined as a consequence of the reforms of 1997 (slightly) and 
2006 (substantial but time limited) and, above all, the impact of the current economic 
recession on the intense destruction of temporary employment (from 31 per cent at 
the end of 2007 to around 25 per cent in 2009). Not only the temporary employment 
rate stands high by international standards but also varies widely among groups of 
workers: it is negatively associated with age and education level and is higher in 
certain sectors (agriculture and construction) and occupations (blue-collar low-
skilled). Moreover, with the advent of the crisis, the traditional gap against women 
has nearly closed (as it has happened with the unemployment rate differential), 
although the share of temporary employment is highest for women in the public 
sector since 2008 (see Figure 5).
7
 
 
7
 Traditionally, the temporary employment rate of women in the private sector was above the 
corresponding for men in the private sector, women in the public sector and men in the public 
sector (in this order). However, the public sector exhibited a steady increase in the share of 
temporary employment since the mid-1990s (this trend was faster for women than for men) 
which counterbalanced the reduction observed in the private sector. The reasons might have 
been a change in hiring behaviour after the Growth and Stability Pact and that a high 
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Figure 5   Share of temporary employment by gender and institutional sector   
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Source: Labour Force Survey. 
3. Institutional background  
In order to describe the current legislation and its recent evolution and how 
legal regulation changes and segmentation are potentially linked to each other, we 
start with the presentation of the employment protection legislation for open-ended 
contracts.
8
 
The legal regulation of dismissal for workers with open-ended contracts must 
be analysed from two complementary perspectives: the wording of the law and the 
practice of the law. We need both perspectives because the practice of dismissal 
regulation created a wide gap of firing costs between open-ended and temporary 
contracts, which was at the origin (at least in part) of the segmentation of jobs in 
Spain. 
The cornerstone of the Spanish legal regulation of dismissals is the fair cause 
for dismissals, based on 158 ILO Convention. Fair causes are associated with either 
 
 
proportion of the EC Structural Funds received by local administrations for promoting active 
labour market policies have been used to hire workers in targeted groups under temporary 
contracts (Dolado et al., 2002). It is worth noting that Spain was engaged in a transfer of 
competences from the Central Administration to local and regional governments during the 
late-1980s and the 1990s. In fact, these levels of government are the ones which show a 
clearly increasing trend of the extensive use of temporary contracts. D’Addio and Rosholm 
(2005) also address the result observed in Spain for all EU Member States using data from 
the ECHP for the period 1994-1999. An in-depth analysis about the wide use of temporary 
contracts in the Spanish public sector is Malo et al. (2011). 
8
 This section partially follows section 2 in Malo (2011b). A comprehensive treatment of 
employment protection for open-ended and temporary contracts is IILS (2011), especially 
chapter 4. 
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misbehaviour of workers (dismissals on disciplinary grounds) or economic reasons. 
A worker with an open-ended contract can file a suit against his/her employer in case 
of dismissal alleging unfair dismissal. When the firm does not offer a fair reason for 
the dismissal, it is considered unfair (in Spanish, improcedente). 
Box 1 shows the evolution of the labour legislation in Spain, and the Appendix 
contains two tables which include a synthesis of the monetary costs according to the 
legal regulation before and after the reform launched in February 2012, respectively. 
We describe both situations because the change is very recent and it will allow us to 
discuss the potential measures against segmentation later. 
 
  Box 1   Brief outline of labour market reforms in Spain (1980-2012) 
– 1980 (November). Workers’ Charter. Adaptation of the main labour market regulation to 
the democratic political system (according to the 1978 Constitutional Act). 
– 1984. First relevant change in the Workers’ Charter: Temporary Contract to Promote 
Employment (breaking the ‘causality principle’ linking temporary contracts to temporary tasks 
and open-ended contracts with permanent tasks of the firm.) 
– 1994. Reinstatement of the ‘causality principle’, regulation of a new type of dismissal 
(individual economic dismissal), legalization of temporary work agencies and many legal 
changes affecting collective bargaining regulation. 
– 1997. New open-ended contract with lower severance payment for unfair dismissal on 
economic grounds (33 wage days per seniority year instead of 45) and subsidies for open-
ended contracts. 
– 2002. ‘Small’ change in unemployment protection law affecting dismissals procedures 
(no changes in the Workers’ Charter) with a huge impact on the bureaucratic management of 
dismissals. This is the origin of the so-called ‘express dismissal’, finished in 48 hours if the 
firm ‘recognises’ that the dismissal was unfair. 
– 2006. New (and more focused) subsidies for open-ended contracts. 
– 2010. Labour market reform affecting different features of dismissals, collective 
bargaining, contracts and financial subsidies (especially for less-skilled young unemployed 
workers) and enhancing possibilities for private labour market intermediation of temporary 
work agencies. 
– 2011. Emergency (short-term) Plan. (i) Programme for improving transitions toward 
stable employment promoting part-time work, including relevant decreases in employers’ 
contributions to Social Security. (ii) Professional re-training for those exhausting 
unemployment insurance and assistance, combining a subsidy for the worker and active 
measures. (iii) Mixed actions for individualised counselling (in public employment services) 
and training for unemployed workers. 
– 2012. The new government elected at the end of December 2011 launches a new labour 
market reform in February 2012. It affects dismissal costs for open-ended contracts (see Table 
A.2 for a synthesis of these changes) and internal flexibility, giving more discretion to the 
employer about working conditions and introducing prevalence of collective agreements at 
firm level with respect to agreements at higher levels. Active policies focus on financial 
incentives (rather generalised, especially for small firms) and not on labour market 
intermediation by PES (as the 2011 Emergency Plan). The new piece of legislation enhances 
the role of temporary work agencies as full private labour market intermediaries for all types 
of contracts (not only temporary contracts). A new ‘training right’ for workers is included in 
the labour market reform, but it heavily depends on further legal developments. 
Source: Malo (2012a) 
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As in many other countries, in Spain the procedure and the requirements differ 
when the economic dismissal affects only one worker (or ‘few’ workers, usually 
below 10 per cent of the total workforce of a firm) and when it affects a significant 
proportion of the workforce (above that threshold). In short, the severance payment 
for fair dismissals on economic grounds is 20 wage days per seniority year (with the 
upper limit of 12 salary months). Before the 2012 labour market reform, the 
severance payment for unfair dismissals on economic grounds was 45 wage days per 
seniority year (with an upper limit of 42 salary months) for ordinary open-ended 
contracts or 33 days (with a limit of 24 months) for ‘promoting’ open-ended 
contracts launched in the 1997 labour market reform aimed to foster permanent 
employment.  
But the reference severance payment for economic dismissals never was 20 
wage days per seniority year but 45, because of the strategic use of the legal 
regulation by firms and workers. This strategic use was deeply rooted in the practice 
of Spanish Labour Law in the past (Malo, 2000, 2005) and clarified even more after 
the passing of the Act 45/2002 (García-Martínez and Malo, 2007; Malo, 2011b). 
In 2002 the government introduced a relatively minor change in the Labour 
Law in order to decrease the bureaucratic costs of individual dismissals. Previously, 
when a dismissal was considered unfair (directly by the courts or indirectly by firms 
in pre-trial agreements), the firm had to pay all the wages from the date of dismissal 
to the judicial decision (the so-called ‘intervening wages’). When the legal procedure 
lasted for more than two months, the firm applied to the Public Administration for 
the reimbursement of all wages in excess of this period of two months. However, in 
2002 the regulation for the reimbursement of these wages was changed, introducing 
at the same time a new way to transfer the severance pay from the firm to the 
worker. If a firm paid the worker for the severance payment corresponding to an 
unfair dismissal (usually 45 salary days per seniority year) up to two days after the 
dismissal letter, then the firm should not have to pay the intervening wages, even if 
the worker filed a suit against the firm for unfair dismissal and finally the case was 
declared unfair by the labour court. In order to provide the worker with an income 
until the judiciary resolution of the case, he/she could apply for unemployment 
benefits just after the dismissal date only by presenting the dismissal letter to the 
Public Employment Service. 
Notice that de facto firms recognised that the dismissal was unfair (they were 
paying the worker the severance payment for unfair dismissals), but they saved the 
cost of the intervening wages in any case. However, as the worker had obtained the 
highest severance pay, why should he/she go to the courts? Therefore, this regulation 
introduced strong incentives to solve dismissals before going to the labour courts and 
even before going to the bargaining institutions. As a side result, the firm saved all 
bureaucratic costs associated with a judiciary case. 
The final outcome was a sort of ‘equilibrium’ of counterweights for employers 
and workers. Employers obtained a really fast way to dismiss workers (dismissals 
were finished in two days) but paying the cost of an unfair dismissal (45 wage days 
per seniority year), which more than doubled the cost of a fair dismissal (20 wage 
days per seniority year). Workers suffered a lack of legal protection against unfair 
causes of dismissal (in fact, the cause of the dismissal was no longer relevant as the 
firm recognised that the dismissal was unfair), but they obtained a substantial 
increase in severance payment (from 20 to 45 wage days per seniority year). The 
available data strongly supports this interpretation (see the empirical evidence shown 
in Malo and González-Sánchez, 2010, and Malo, 2011b). 
Therefore, although in the wording of the Labour Law the reference for the 
severance pay in economic dismissals was implicitly assumed to be 20 wage days 
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per seniority year, in practice this reference amounted to 45 wage days per seniority 
year.
9
 Besides the (relevant) increase in the monetary cost of a dismissal, a negative 
side result of this strategic use of the dismissal regulation is that unfair dismissals are 
assumed to be the rule and not the exception. This outcome is even worse if one 
takes into account that the wording of the Labour Law is based on a basic principle: 
no dismissal without a fair cause. This implies that the strategic use of the dismissal 
regulation has resulted in a distorted use of the legal norms.  
The 2010 labour market reform introduced a new definition of economic causes 
to correct this distorted use. The explicit objective in this case was to foster the use 
of fair economic dismissals. In other words, with the new definition firms should 
have the certainty that a dismissal would be considered fair by a tribunal when true 
economic grounds exist. It seems that the reform was partially effective in 
decreasing the above-mentioned distorted use (Malo, 2012a), although we do not 
know for sure whether this effect was strictly associated with the reform because of 
the short time span this regulation has been in force. 
The reform launched in February 2012 follows the same rationale than the 
previous one, since it tries to precise more the definition of dismissals for economic 
grounds. Its explicit objective is to make the fair severance payment for economic 
dismissals the new reference and to finish with the distorted use of the legal 
regulation. It is obviously too soon to consider whether this new reform will be 
effective or not. On the one hand, trade unions have heavily rejected the reform, 
since they consider that it has effectively reduced workers’ severance payments. On 
the other hand, the government expects a relevant success of this last legal change, 
providing firms with internal flexibility and eliminating incentives for a dual labour 
market. The limited evidence available (Malo, 2012b) suggests that the distortion of 
the dismissal system seems to be decreasing after February 2012, although at the 
same time much more cases are arriving at the labour courts, something that is 
related to relevant uncertainties about the use and interpretation of the new legal 
regulation governing dismissals on economic grounds. 
Taking the previous reasoning into account, the gap in firing costs in Spain has 
been running from 12 wages days per seniority year for temporary contracts to 
(usually) 45 for open-ended contracts. In other words, the marginal increase in 
severance payments when changing from a temporary to an open-ended contract was 
33 wage days per seniority year. Of course, this seems to be a strong incentive for 
using temporary contracts instead of open-ended contracts. Thus, the labour market 
reform implemented in 2012 tries to close this gap, reducing it from 33 to only 8 
days (20 for open-ended contracts and 12 for temporary contracts). If the reform is 
successful, the marginal increase in severance payments will be much decreased in 
the next future.  
Nevertheless, one expects that the reduction in the use of temporary contracts 
would be slow. In the past, the easy use of temporary contracts created incentives for 
the maintenance of the (already existent) segmentation of jobs, especially in large 
firms (Toharia, 2005). Therefore, employers adapted their production process to take 
advantage of the existence of a group of workers in low-paid, high-rotation jobs, 
hired through temporary contracts, while using open-ended contracts for high-paid, 
low-rotation jobs. This outcome is originally related to the ease of use of temporary 
 
9
 The system was so effective for firms that even collective dismissals were scarcely used, 
unless the firm was in a sudden and extremely bad economic situation (Malo and González-
Sánchez, 2010). 
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contracts and the gap in firing costs. But once this segmentation exists, the 
expectation is that a sudden decrease in the firing costs gap will have a slow impact 
on the use of temporary contracts, since changing the organization of work is costly. 
The change would be easier in small firms where allocation of tasks to jobs is much 
more ‘blurry’. However, even in these firms there will be relevant limits to lower the 
use of temporary contracts, because small firms usually need more flexibility in 
order to manage their staff, as they have a narrower leeway in bad times and the 
ending of a temporary contract usually provide a less drastic adjustment than a 
dismissal. 
Finally, it is important to address that the extension of the segmentation in the 
labour market and the predominant role of temporary contracts as a means of 
flexibility have been closely associated with the development of the Labour Law and 
not to the practice of collective agreements. Changes in the employment protection 
legislation fostering the use of temporary contracts (as in 1984) created basic 
conditions for (the extension of) jobs’ segmentation in Spain. However, once 
temporary contracts spread over the economy, collective bargaining had a side effect 
on the use by firms of these contracts as a substitute for wage, working hours or 
working conditions adjustments. In fact, the most recent legal reforms (in 2010 and 
2012) have tried to affect also the collective bargaining system in order to mitigate 
the use of temporary contracts and their pervasive effects on other economic 
variables. 
Furthermore, before the 2012 reform, the legal regulation did not provide 
incentives for adjustments of wages and/or working hours or changes in working 
conditions as a substitute for dismissals or ends of temporary contracts. Legal 
procedures for not applying the sector agreement (opting out) when facing specific 
problems were slow and rather complicated, so that non-agreement situations 
regarding changes in wages, working hours or, in general, working conditions were 
very difficult to solve. This was the alleged reason for the 2012 reform (and 
previously the 2010 reform, but with a different intensity) to implement a set of legal 
changes affecting ‘internal flexibility’ in general and collective bargaining in 
particular. 
As regards how to change working conditions within firms when facing an 
economic downturn, the new legal regulation differs when the modifications are 
considered either collective or individual (using the same thresholds than for 
dismissals). In the case of collective modifications of working conditions, consulting 
and bargaining with workers’ representatives are required. However, in the case of 
‘individual’ modifications (below such thresholds) the employer can unilaterally 
decide with few limits. This is a key difference with respect to the previous 
legislation, being a relevant change in the Spanish Labour Law. In fact, it can be 
interpreted as a clear movement of the bargaining power from workers’ 
representatives to employers, leaving many situations under an individualized 
bargaining between the worker and the employer. 
As for collective bargaining, there is a new time limit (one year) for collective 
agreements to be in force after they have finished their economic effects. Once this 
limit is exceeded, workers will be covered by the corresponding higher-level (for 
instance, sector or inter-sector) collective agreement. The 2010 labour market reform 
introduced different time limits, but in fact non-agreement usually led to extend the 
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last agreement with few limitations.
10
 Presumably, this change will erode time inertia 
of wages at macro level.  
There is also a new regulation on how a specific firm may opt out the sectoral 
collective agreement in order to obtain more lenient working conditions (usually, 
lower wages). As this procedure is relatively long and complex with different stages 
in case of non-agreement, it is expected that firms will choose a different way. The 
2012 reform allows an employer to sign a firm-level collective agreement before the 
end of the corresponding sectoral agreement. Furthermore, the firm-level agreement 
will prevail with respect to any other higher-level agreement. Therefore, it will be 
shorter and easier to sign a firm-level collective agreement than using the legal 
regulation for opting out with respect to the sectoral agreement. Presumably, the 
practice will create a sort of negotiated opting out, including bargaining with 
workers. Nevertheless, we still lack empirical information about what firms facing 
an opting out are doing to say something more on this issue. 
If all these changes which have to do with internal flexibility and collective 
bargaining are effective, firms will face a wider menu of adjustment variables (other 
than the ending of temporary contracts or dismissals). Therefore, one of the most 
negative side results of a dual labour market (the high volatility in employment and 
unemployment) would be mitigated. On the other hand, adjustment in wages and, in 
general, in working conditions will be much more frequent than in the past and wage 
inequality will probably increase. Anyway, all the above-mentioned changes 
represent a relevant novelty in the Spanish industrial relations system, so unions and 
employers will spend some time adapting to the new rules. Our expectation is that 
not only there will be more labour conflicts but even the number of grievances in 
labour courts will probably increase during the adaptation period. The limited 
empirical evidence available (Malo, 2012b) shows that the number of signed 
collective agreements after the 2012 reform has declined substantially with respect to 
the same months of reference in the previous years. This outcome may also be 
related to relevant uncertainties about how to apply the new regulation in an 
economic context with many national and international economic worries.  
 
10
 In Spanish legal jargon, this is called ‘ultra-actividad’ of collective agreements. 
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4. Segmentation and its implication for the quality of jobs 
4.1. The origin of segmentation 
In Spain, labour market segmentation has mainly adopted the form of 
temporary contracts. Not only these contract arrangements are widely used in all 
economic sectors (Toharia, 2005) but either in seasonal or non-seasonal economic 
activities they are much more used than in other countries (Felgueroso and Jiménez, 
2010). In fact, the Public Administration has become more intensive than the private 
sector in the use of temporary contracts in the last ten years (Malo et al., 2011). 
There has been a long social and academic debate about what is behind the 
wide and intense use of these contracts in Spain. We have previously argued that the 
gap of dismissal costs jointly with the side effects of collective bargaining promoted 
the use of temporary contracts as an easy (and relatively cheap) way for adjustments 
to the business cycle. Moreover, firms adapted their strategies regarding the 
organization of their workforce and the management of human resources to this 
reality. In fact, temporary contracts helped strengthen the already existent 
segmentation of jobs, promoting a segmentation of workers: ‘bad’ jobs were more 
closely related to temporary contracts while ‘good’ jobs were more related to open-
ended contracts. This would be a sort of segmentation where both types of job and 
worker are complementary rather than substitute. 
Notice that this follows the idea of segmentation proposed by Doeringer and 
Piore (1971), where the concept of dual labour market is introduced in a similar way: 
‘bad’ jobs correspond to the secondary labour market with low wages, poor working 
conditions and no career prospects, while ‘good’ jobs correspond to the primary 
labour market with higher wages, better conditions and possibilities for a working 
career through internal labour markets. The key aspect linking our interpretation of 
segmentation with that of Doeringer and Piore (1971) is that in their analysis the 
dual jobs structure within firms is an answer to the uncertainty in the goods markets. 
By concentrating the rotation of workers in the secondary ‘segment’, employers 
minimize their costs, while it preserves investments in workers hired for ‘good’ jobs. 
A key element of this interpretation of dual labour markets hinges on the assumption 
that both types of job are complements rather than substitutes, since both are 
necessary for the production process. Although rotation is concentrated on workers 
filling ‘bad’ jobs, the gross flows of both types of worker will move together; 
however, turnover will be much higher among workers in ‘bad’ jobs that among 
those in ‘good’ jobs. 
Empirical evidence from data on Spanish large firms shows that the gross flows 
of both types of job move together, which is consistent with this idea of 
complementarity (Amuedo-Dorantes and Malo, 2008). This is also coherent with the 
evolution of the share of temporary employment in the private sector by employer 
size (see Figure 6).  
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Figure 6   Share of temporary employment in the private sector by employer size 
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Source: Encuesta de Coyuntura Laboral. 
This proportion has been decreasing in smallest firms (less than 10 workers), 
while it has remained more or less stable in larger firms (above 250 workers). In 
1997 and 2006 different financial incentives were launched to promote hires using 
open-ended contracts and conversion of temporary contracts into open-ended ones. 
However, the temporary employment rate in larger firms remained rather stable 
(even increased slightly), which is consistent with the existence of a segmentation of 
jobs within firms: temporary contracts would be used for specific types of job, so it 
would not pay for the firm to use open-ended contracts for these jobs even after 
considering financial incentives. However, tasks in small firms are not clearly 
assigned to jobs and the use of temporary contracts would be only a matter of 
financial costs. Therefore, the existence of financial incentives would have affected 
their reliance on temporary contracts. The empirical evidence supports this idea, 
since the share of temporary employment in small firms decreased just after the 
launching of new financial incentives in 2006 while this did not happen in large 
firms (Malo and González-Sánchez, 2010). 
Furthermore, one may arrive at the same conclusion after looking at the 
aggregate transition rates from permanent and temporary employment to other states 
(other job with a different employer, unemployment or out-of the labour force). 
Figure 7 and 8 display these rates, which are based on the linked micro-data files of 
the LFS. Care must be taken when comparing them, since the scale is different: 
about 4 per cent in 2005-2011 (less than 3 per cent in 2001-2004) of all permanent 
workers change their labour market status each quarter, while this proportion 
amounts to 25 per cent in 2005-2011 (20 per cent in 2001-2004) in the case of 
temporary workers.
11
 The rotation implicit in the rates of this latter group is quite 
large.  
 
11
 The once-and-for-all sharp increase in the transitions from permanent employment to 
inactivity in the first quarter of 2005 was due to a methodological change in the LFS. This 
change also affected the transitions from temporary to permanent employment. 
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Figure 7    Quarterly outflow rates of workers from open-ended employment to other states (other job, 
unemployment or out-of-the labour force) 
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Source: Labour Force Survey (linked files). 
 
 
 
Figure 8    Quarterly outflow rates of workers from fixed-term employment to other states (other job, 
unemployment or out-of-the labour force) 
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Source: Labour Force Survey (linked files). 
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However, it can be better grasped if one calculates the quarterly transition rates 
from temporary to permanent employment (the latter may be with the same or with a 
different employer). Figure 9 offers this information. The proportion of workers 
holding a temporary contract in a given quarter who have an open-ended contract in 
the next quarter was about 5 per cent in 2001-2004, around 10 per cent in 2005-2008 
(with a peak at the end of 2006 and the beginning of 2007 corresponding to the 
effects of the financial incentives associated with the 2006 labour market reform) 
and about 8 per cent in 2009-2011. Both pieces of information imply that the 
majority of temporary workers move (directly or indirectly) from a fixed-term 
contract to another one in the short-run and only a minority achieves an open-ended 
contract. It conveys the idea that the movement between segments is very limited.
12
 
Figure 9  Quarterly outflow rates of workers from fixed-term employment to permanent employment  
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Source: Labour Force Survey (linked files). 
 But, how was that this segmented labour market was originated? To answer 
this question, we should focus on the legal changes aimed at easing the use of 
temporary contracts passed about three decades ago. At the end of the 1970s, the 
Spanish economy was involved in a severe economic and political crisis. In 1975, 
the dictator Franco died and the political system began a transformation process 
towards a fully democratic political system. The first part of this process finished in 
December 1978, when the new democratic Constitution was enacted. Afterwards, 
legal regulation was changed step by step to adapt it to the requirements of 
democratic political rules (such as allowing free trade unions and a non-intervened 
collective bargaining, for instance). 
At the end of 1980, the Workers’ Charter (Estatuto de los Trabajadores) was 
enacted, trying to provide the basic legal regulation for a democratic labour relations 
system and to leave behind the old Francoist labour market legislation. The open-
 
12
 A similar conclusion (although less radical) can be achieved using individual longitudinal 
data for a longer period of time, not only two quarters (see Box 2). 
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ended contract was defined as the ‘default’ labour contract. Other types of contracts 
(as fixed-term, part-time, etc.) were allowed, but they were conceived for specific 
tasks or for seasonal or transitory economic needs of the firms. This rationale was 
also part of the previous legal regulation and, in fact, the basic legal regulation 
governing dismissals under the dictatorship remained.
13
 
Nevertheless, the increase of the unemployment rate above 20 per cent in the 
early-1980s led the government to consider legal changes to promote employment 
and to decrease unemployment. In those years, there was a social debate about 
changing (decreasing) severance payments for open-ended contracts in order to 
promote hires. However, public authorities (and many labour market experts and 
practitioners) believed that such a legal change would allow a fast and economy-
wide substitution of older workers (with a low average educational level) by young 
workers (with a higher educational level, being cheaper because of the relevance of 
seniority complements in wages’ determination in Spain). In addition, because of the 
predominant role of male breadwinners’ households, such substitution would have 
had (hypothetically) a negative impact on the welfare of many households. 
The political choice was to implement a legal change easing the use of 
temporary contracts. In formal terms, the change seemed to be rather small: a new 
temporary contract for employment promotion.
14
 Notice that this type of legal 
change was a reform ‘at the margin’, i.e., it was a change affecting the new entrants 
into the labour market but not the incumbents. Therefore, the extension of temporary 
contracts affected younger workers in the first instance: as they were entering into 
the labour market they were, almost by definition, at the margin. However, as it 
become evident later, this reform also affected low-skilled workers in the medium- 
and long-run, as they usually face a higher turnover rate than high-skilled workers. 
Later, during the 2000s, a new group of workers at the margin of the Spanish labour 
market (i.e. immigrant workers) was also exposed to the effects of temporary 
contracts. 
The supportive role of Spanish families has been an adaptive behaviour and a 
social complement to the huge extension of temporary contracts jointly with the 
relatively high unemployment rates for young people. Following Garrido (1996), 
there was a sort of ‘implicit social agreement’ between old and young generations. 
The labour market reform at the margin allowed older workers to remain in their 
jobs. As a counterpart, older workers (in their role of breadwinners of their families 
and tax payers) supported the precariousness of young people (many times their sons 
and daughters). Fiscal redistribution reinforced this scheme of inter-generational 
transfers: older workers supported the Welfare State paying taxes to fund 
unemployment protection and the extension of the educational system. However, this 
‘implicit agreement’ has become increasingly difficult to continue as temporary 
 
13
 A relevant change with respect to the previous legislation was that judges could not 
modulate severance payments. With the Workers’ Charter there are fixed minima and 
maxima for severance payment and judges could only decide whether the dismissal was 
either fair or unfair. As usual, fair and unfair dismissals had different minima and maxima for 
severance payments, as they differ in dismissals either on disciplinary (worker’s 
misbehaviour) or on economic grounds. See Malo (2011b) for a description of the current 
severance payments and their main changes in the last two decades. 
14
 Although temporary contracts existed before that date, they were only relevant for the 
construction and tourism industry. Nevertheless, there was a limited use of new types of 
temporary contracts between 1975 and 1981 as a means to promote new hires, but none of 
them was really relevant (Malo, 2005). 
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contracts have become more frequent at older ages (especially for low-skilled people 
and more recently for immigrant workers), the household prices bubble in the 2000s 
increased the costs of forming new families and the job instability associated with 
temporary contracts delayed childbearing and decreased fertility rates.
15
 
 
4.2. The effects of segmentation on the quality of jobs16 
The impact of the extension of temporary contracts on job and employment 
stability and security has been relevant. Studies on job stability usually define simple 
measures on the distribution of elapsed employment tenure; for instance, the shares 
of workers with tenure of less than one year and of less than six years. Looking at 
the evolution of these measures, we can assess whether job stability has changed in 
Spain in the last three decades (see also Arranz and García-Serrano, 2007, who 
examine the period 1987-2003). 
The share of workers with less than one year of tenure has witnessed a radical 
change during these years (see Figure 10). First, there was a strong increase between 
1987 and 1995, coinciding with the expansion of use of temporary contracts: from 
less than 20 per cent to 34 per cent. Then, a period of stability came from 1995 to 
1999, a reduction of more than 5 pp in four years (1999-2003) and then a new period 
of stability from 2003 to 2007.
17
 With the advent of the current crisis, the share of 
workers with less than one year of tenure has declined about 9 pp in five years. 
Furthermore, the share of workers with less than six years of tenure shows a 
somehow similar evolution. It exhibited a strong increase in 1987-1992, a fall 
between 1992 and 1993 and a period of stability until 1997. Then, the share 
increased again until 2001 (contrary to what happened to the other measure), 
remaining more or less stable until the end of 2007. Since then, it has declined 12 pp. 
The proportions of workers with short and medium seniority reflect the changes 
in the business cycle, the use of temporary contracts and the effects of labour market 
reforms. This can be seen in the previous figure, which displays both shares for 
workers with open-ended and fixed-term contracts. The reduction observed in the 
share of workers with less than one year of tenure (concentrated in the group holding 
temporary contracts) and the increase observed in the share of workers with less than 
five years of tenure (concentrated in the group holding open-ended contracts) at the 
end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s is probably due to the effects of the 
 
15
 Nevertheless, the aggregate fertility rate in Spain is the compound of two very different 
groups: a low fertility rate among Spanish people and a high fertility rate among immigrants 
(Garrido and Malo, 2005). 
16
 The results commented on this subsection stem from published studies (mainly carried out 
by the authors of this report) based on the estimation of multivariate models using the micro-
data of diverse databases. Therefore, they are net of the effects of a set of worker, job and 
employer attributes used to take account of individual and job heterogeneity. Partial 
reproduction of some econometric outcomes is provided in order to make some statements 
clear. 
17
 A once-and-for-all sharp reduction is observed in the first quarter of 2005 which was due 
to a methodological change in the LFS. It brought about an alteration of the distribution of 
employment tenure: a reduction of workers in the category of “less than 3 months” and a 
corresponding increase in the category of “6 years or more”. 
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Figure 10   Share of workers with less than one year and less of six years of tenure, by types of contract   
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
100,0
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
Q
4
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
% <1 year All
% <1 year Open-ended
% <1 year Fixed-term
% <6 years All
% <6 years Open-ended
% <6 years Fixed-term
 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
 
labour market reform launched in 1997, which established a new open-ended 
contract and financial incentives for the transformation of temporary contracts on 
permanent ones. Therefore, although job creation during the economic expansion of 
the late-1990s was based mainly on the use of temporary contracts (and, in fact, the 
share of temporary employment did not declined much, as we have seen above), 
there was a relative movement of workers in the distribution of seniority from jobs 
with short-term elapsed duration towards jobs with medium-term elapsed duration. 
However, no trace of the 2006 reform aimed at reducing the excessive use of 
temporary contracts and worker turnover is visible in the seniority data. Furthermore, 
workers in temporary jobs have been hardly hit by the current recession, but it seems 
that this has not resulted in an alteration of the distribution of seniority for this 
group. However, the reduction of permanent positions during the crisis has 
concentrated in workers with short and medium tenure, therefore reducing these 
proportions and increasing average length of service for workers with open-ended 
contracts. 
One important issue to consider is that the level and the evolution of job 
stability measures differ across groups of workers. From a static point of view, if we 
measure job stability using the share of workers with less than one year of tenure (or 
five years), we find that stability is lower for younger individuals, women (with 
children aged less than 6 years) and workers in the private sector, in blue-collar low-
skilled occupations, in sectors such as agriculture and building and holding 
temporary contracts. These findings hold after controlling for a set of individual, job 
and employer attributes (see Arranz and García-Serrano, 2007, and the estimate 
results of a logit model displayed in Table 1). 
Adopting a dynamic perspective, the increase of job instability from the late-
1980s to the early-2000s, which occurs for all groups of workers, is more patent for 
some of them. This can be seen in Table 2, which gives the estimated trend 
coefficients for the aggregate share of workers with tenure less than one year and 
less than five years by gender, age, educational level, contract arrangement, 
occupation and institutional sector.  On the one hand, the trend component in the 
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share of workers in short term-jobs is positive and significant over the sample 
period. The aggregate fraction of workers with job tenure less than one year has risen 
around 0.7 percentage point a year during the period 1987-2003, once personal and 
job characteristics are taken into account. In fact, it has risen one percentage point a 
year when we discount the effect of the cycle on the trend. The same has happened 
with the share of workers with job tenure less of five years: they increased 0.5 
percentage points a year after controlling personal and job characteristics and 0.6 
percentage points once the effect of the cycle is additionally discounted. This 
increase in job instability has been larger for individuals aged less than 35 years, 
with low levels of attainted education, working in blue-collar low-skilled 
occupations, in the private sector, in certain economic sectors (especially, agriculture 
and building) and holding temporary contracts. 
The estimation procedure consists of two steps. In the first step, all available 
cross sections of the LFS are pooled and a logit model is estimated on the probability 
of belonging to each tenure category conditional on a set of year dummies, personal 
characteristics (gender, age, marital status, educational attainment, etc.) and job 
controls (occupation, type of contract, institutional sector, industry, etc.). Using the 
calendar year coefficients, year-specific probabilities are then calculated (the logit 
function is evaluated at the observed mean of the other covariates). In the second 
step of the estimation, these probabilities are regressed on a linear time trend and a 
cyclical control (unemployment rate) using ordinary least squares. Moreover, as the 
error term in the second step regression may be heteroskedastic because errors are 
subject to small sample bias (17 observations for the 17 year specific probabilities), 
consistent standard errors estimates are provided using the jackknife method in those 
regressions where the error term is heteroskedastic. The first column for each tenure 
category shows the estimated trends in the regression-adjusted probabilities without 
controlling for the cyclical component (unemployment rate), which is incorporated 
in the second column. The coefficients can be read either as yearly unit changes or as 
yearly percentage changes if we multiply them by 100. 
This evolution of employment stability has translated into perceptions of job 
security. Dolado et al. (2010) examines data coming from the International Social 
Survey Programme (ISSP), a large international harmonized survey. Every eight 
years, it publishes a “work orientation” module where the results of a survey on a 
representative sample of wage and salary workers on diverse labour issues are given. 
The last available module is that from 2005, a boom year. In one of the questions, 
the survey asks the workers to evaluate whether “employment is secure”. Here, 
employment should be understood as the current job at the moment of the interview 
as well as the possibility of accessing to another one with similar characteristics in 
the short run. There are five potential answers, ranging from ‘absolutely agree’ to 
‘absolutely disagree’. The data show that the proportion of workers who respond that 
they ‘agree’ or ‘absolutely agree’ is 27 per cent for Spain. This share does not differ 
much from the one observed for some countries (France, Germany or the US) but is 
larger than that for others (the UK, the Nordic countries and Belgium, for instance). 
Moreover, that proportion varies dramatically with age (Figure 11): it is lowest for 
people aged 16-24 (13 per cent) and highest for people aged 55-64 (40 per cent). 
This huge age differential is not clearly observed for other countries examined 
(France, Germany, the US and Denmark), where such differential is very small 
except for the group of people aged 55-64.  
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Figure 11   Perception of job security by age group  
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More recently, the last edition (2010) of the ECVT survey includes additional 
information on job security for employed individuals.
18
 Workers are inquired on the 
likelihood of maintaining their current job within the next six months. They dispose 
of four answers ranging from ‘absolutely unlikely’ to ‘absolutely likely’. The 
proportion of workers who consider it ‘absolutely unlikely’ or ‘very unlikely’ is 10 
per cent. This proportion declines with age and education level and as we move from 
blue-collar low-skilled occupations to white-collar high-skilled occupations, and is 
higher for men, workers in small and medium-sized firms (less than 250 workers) 
and in certain industries (construction, agriculture, hotels and restaurants, and 
domestic services).
19
 
Regarding working conditions, there are relevant differences by type of contract 
at descriptive level. Differences remain even when we compare temporary and 
permanent workers with the same seniority at the firm. Quality of life at work and 
job satisfaction is also clearly lower for workers with temporary contracts. García-
Serrano (2004) has carried out the most complete analysis comparing workers with 
open-ended and temporary contracts using data from the early-2000s. His findings 
show that workers holding temporary contracts exhibit lower scores for seven 
objective indicators on the quality of working life. Moreover, temporary workers 
also show higher expected possibilities to leave their current firm within one year, 
 
18
 The “Working Conditions Survey” (Encuesta de Calidad de Vida en el Trabajo, ECVT) is 
a yearly survey first launched by the Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in 1999. 
This is a nationally representative random sample survey of all employed individuals aged 16 
years and above living in households (Ceuta and Melilla are excluded). This survey contains 
information on a wide range of issues related to the working life of employed individuals as 
well as on a set of personal, job and employer characteristics. A significant change in the 
methodology was carried out in 2006 (in fact, the survey was not conducted in 2005). 
19
 These findings hold when including or excluding those individuals for whom the question 
does not hold (because they retire, their contracts end, etc.). 
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although the reasons for leaving differ between both types of workers: more than 
half of all temporary workers say they will leave because their contracts will 
finish/they will be laid off, while more than half of all permanent workers will leave 
due to other reasons -retirement, family reasons, etc. These results hold even when 
we distinguish among different job tenure categories (see Table 3).  
García-Serrano (2004) also tries to respond to the question on why temporary 
workers exhibit lower scores than their permanent counterparts in objective 
indicators on working life. The simplest reason to explain the existence of these 
differences relies in that their jobs are different: workers holding temporary contracts 
suffer worse working conditions than workers holding permanent contracts simply 
because they occupy worse jobs. To test that possibility, a multivariate analysis on 
all seven objective indicators on working conditions is performed including a wide 
range of explanatory variables (individual, job and employer characteristics). 
Estimate results indicate that differences in working conditions remain after 
controlling for all those variables (see Table 4). In particular, temporary workers 
with short job tenure seem to occupy jobs with poorer working conditions, but 
differences between permanent and temporary workers with longer tenure are less 
marked. This might suggest that temporary workers occupy not only entry-level jobs 
but also other jobs which are similar to those occupied by workers with permanent 
contracts. In other words, firms would be using temporary contracts as a way to 
lower production costs, hiring workers on a temporary basis in order to perform 
“permanent” activities. 
Another indicator of job quality is participation in on-the-job training. 
Empirical evidence usually shows that temporary workers have less access to 
training when compared with their permanent counterparts. For instance, OECD 
(2002) finds that the effect of holding a temporary job is to reduce access to training, 
after controlling for various individual and job characteristics, using pooling data 
from the ECHP for 12 European countries. In the case of Spain that is the case when 
one uses databases such as the ECHP and the ECVT but not with the LFS (which, by 
the way, gives a monthly aggregate training incidence implausibly low). 
One of the advantages of using the ECVT is that it makes possible to 
distinguish between the conventional measure of training incidence (the “total 
incidence” of training, i.e. the proportion of workers who participate in training 
activities over total workers) and what we can call the “conditional incidence” of 
training (the proportion of workers who participate in training activities over workers 
employed in training firms). This is because the survey contains two questions on 
both participating in on-the-job training and being working in a firm who carry out 
training activities.
20
 This distinction is important because there are two steps to 
follow for a worker to receive training from the firm where he/she is working: first, 
the worker must be employed in a firm providing training activities; and second, 
once the worker is employed in a training-providing firm, he/she must be chosen to 
participate in those activities. 
 
20
 Information about training comes from the following question in the questionnaire: 
“During the last year, has the firm in which you work carried out some training activities for 
their workforce?” Before 2006, those who answer to that question in the affirmative were 
interrogated about the frequency of participation on the activity courses carried out by the 
firm (all possible answers were the following: never, seldom, sometimes, often, and always). 
From 2006 onwards, all interviewees are inquired about whether they have participated in 
some training organised and financed by their current employer during the last year. This 
change in the questionnaire has certainly had an influence on the measures of training 
incidence. 
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The data indicate that less than one fourth in 2002-2004 and more than a third 
in 2006-2010 of all wage and salary workers participate in training (Table 5). These 
figures are higher for workers with permanent contracts than for their temporary 
counterparts. They also vary depending upon employers’ characteristics (they 
increase with firm size and are much larger in public-owned firms and institutions 
and in certain industries –finance, public administration, education and health), job 
attributes (they raise as we move from blue-collar low-skilled jobs to white-collar 
high-skilled jobs) and workers’ characteristics (they increase with the attained 
education level and hold an inverse-U relationship with age). 
This outcome is partly due to the distribution of workers over training and non-
training firms. The proportion of all wage and salary workers employed in training 
firms was over one third in 2002-2004 and about one half in 2006-2010. Workers 
with open-ended contracts exhibit substantially higher values than their temporary 
counterparts. Again, these figures vary dramatically depending on employer, job and 
worker attributes (the same as before). However, the proportion of workers who 
participate in training activities over workers employed in training firms (the 
“conditional incidence” of training) does not show as much variation across 
characteristics as the previous measure (although differences exist). These findings 
seem to suggest that the main source affecting an individual likelihood of 
participating in on-the-job training is to be employed before-hand in a firm providing 
training activities. 
Albert et al. (2005), who estimate multivariate models to analyse the 
relationship between types of contract and on-the-job training (Table 6), confirm the 
previous findings. First, workers holding temporary contracts are less likely to be 
employed in firms providing training: the share of temporary employees over total 
employees is larger in firms that do not train their workforce than in firms that do 
train it. Second, once workers are employed in firms providing firm-based training, 
holding a temporary (fixed-term) contract also reduces the probability of being 
chosen to participate in training activities, after taking account of other worker, job 
and employer characteristics. 
This last nuance gives some interesting information: if temporary workers are 
more present in firms carrying out less training (or not training at all), then the 
organization of jobs at firm level and the technology applied in the production 
process might be playing a key role. In other words, the fact that non-training firms 
are more prone to use temporary contracts is likely to be associated with productive 
features such as their jobs’ structure and the technology they use (and also to their 
location in the international division of labour and the way they compete for in the 
product markets). OECD (1991) points out that those industries with lower training 
incidence are associated with a low degree of technological progress and/or a high 
proportion of small and medium-sized firms. Therefore, the evidence for Spain 
might be suggesting that using temporary contracts is a decision linked to the 
organization of the firm and not only a matter of costs related to the legal regulation 
of labour contracts. 
Notice that the huge expansion of the construction sector in the last decade is 
not the responsible for the wide use of temporary contracts, since they were widely 
used before the speculative bubble of the household prices.
21
 In a similar vein, the 
 
21
 For instance, according to Figure 5, the share of temporary employment in the private 
sector in 1996 was 44 per cent for women and 37 per cent for men. These shares were lower 
at the beginning of the 2000s, when one can safely place the start of the speculative bubble in 
household prices. 
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relevance of tourism has been sometimes blamed as responsible for the extension of 
temporary contracts. Nevertheless, different analyses show that temporary contracts 
are widely used in the whole sectors of the Spanish economy (Toharia, 2005; 
Felgueroso and Jiménez, 2010). But even the relatively wider use in the tourism 
industry is ‘peculiar’. According to Malo (2011a), the expected seasonal pattern of 
temporary contracts in this sector is clearly confirmed by the statistical figures, with 
increases in the share of temporary employment of around 5 percentage points in the 
second and third quarters respect to the first and fourth quarters. However, while for 
men the share of temporary employment in the tourism industry is around the 
aggregate male share for the whole economy, in the case of women this share is 7-9 
percentage points higher than the corresponding female aggregate share. A marked 
difference in occupations by gender in the tourism industry lies behind this 
difference, as women usually are located in low-skilled jobs while men perform any 
type of job including those more skill demanding. As a side result, the working 
careers of women in the tourism industry are highly unstable in the long-term when 
compared with men working in this sector (Muñoz-Bullón and Malo, 2008).  
To sum up, although the construction and tourism sectors are much relevant in 
Spain than in other countries and they usually rely more on temporary contracts (by 
international standards), they are not the main drivers of segmentation in the Spanish 
labour market. In fact, it is worth noting that the Spanish Labour Law has provided 
firms long time ago with specific contracts to deal with seasonality having an annual 
pattern in order to give a legal recognition to long-term labour relationships but 
regularly interrupted.
22
 
Job quality can also be analysed using information on job satisfaction. The 
ECVT survey elicits data from workers on their satisfaction with their current job 
(they have to put in a scale where 0 is ‘very dissatisfied’ and 10 ‘very satisfied’).23 
Data show that a small proportion of workers (less than 5 per cent) say that they are 
dissatisfied (values 0-3), about one fourth that they are neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied (values 4-6), around one half that their level of satisfaction is quite good 
(values 7-8), and about 20 per cent that they are satisfied (values 9-10). Therefore, 
average values are located just below 7 (years 2002-2004) or above 7 (years 2006-
2010). Differences across employer, job and workers characteristics are not very 
large (Table 7), with those having a university degree, working in white-collar high-
skilled jobs and in certain industries (public administration, education and health) 
exhibiting higher averages. Satisfaction also increases monotonically with the level 
of earnings. Employers, workers in the public sector and those holding a permanent 
contract are more satisfied than workers in the private sector and those holding a 
temporary contract. 
Some of these differences persist when one controls adequately for firm, job 
and worker characteristics but others tend to disappear. For instance, García-Serrano 
(2009) uses the ECVT data to examine whether job satisfaction is influenced by 
 
22
 It is the case of the so called ‘contrato fijo discontinuo’ (per-task open-ended contract), 
mainly used in tourism (in the Balearic Islands, for instance) and in agriculture. Nevertheless, 
the share of this type of contract in the total of open-ended contracts (and in the total of all 
contracts) is rather low. For seasonal reasons, there is a specific temporary contract which 
can be used by any firm affected by seasonality; it is a contract with no specific 
characteristics save the explicit recognition of the reason for the temporary hiring (i.e., 
seasonality). 
23
 The exact wording of the question changed from 2006 onwards. This change might have 
influenced the results. 
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unionization when the terms of collective agreements are extended to all the 
workers, whether members or not, as in the Spanish case. Empirical findings 
(Table 8) suggest that a negative influence of union membership on job satisfaction 
and a positive one for collective agreements at firm level exist, but these effects 
vanish once variables capturing working conditions and the industrial relations 
climate are taken into account (this would mean that the positive/negative effect of 
unions on satisfaction previously found could be due to the positive/negative 
relationship between collective bargaining and job attributes capturing employee 
control in the workplace). However, the impact of the contract arrangement remains 
after controlling for all those variables: workers holding a temporary contract would 
show lower job satisfaction scores than their permanent counterparts. 
Turning now to wages and earnings, the share of (full-time) wage and salary 
workers in low pay jobs in Spain is just below the OECD average: in 2009, it was 
15.7 per cent in Spain and 16.3 per cent in the OECD.
24
 Using data for all workers 
(full-time and part-time) increases this share to around 18 per cent in 2008-2009 
(with a dubious fall to 13.4 per cent in 2010).
25
 This group of workers is deemed to 
be made up mainly of women, foreign-born people, young workers, workers in low-
skilled jobs and individuals working part-time and holding temporary contracts, 
since these groups of individuals earn less on average. In particular, workers with 
temporary contracts earned about 35 per cent less than their permanent counterparts 
–using annual earnings- or more 30 per cent less –using hourly earnings- in 2004-
2005 (Figure 12). This contract pay gap has declined until 2009 but increased in 
2010. It is always larger for men than for women. 
Figure 12   Contract pay gap (difference in earnings between open-ended and temporary 
workers, in percentage).  
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 Low pay is defined as having hourly earnings below 2/3 of median earnings. The OECD 
figure is an unweighted average for 27 countries ( OECD, 2011, Statistical Annex, Table I). 
25
 This information comes from the Yearly Survey on Wage Structure (Encuesta Anual de 
Estructura Salarial, EAES). An alternative way of defining and measuring low pay is to 
consider workers who earn the statutory minimum wage or less. In this case, using 
information from tax sources (collected by the Tax Administration National Agency), the 
share of low pay workers remained stable around 28 per cent in 2002-2008 and increased to 
31 per cent in 2009-2010. 
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These differences persist even controlling for individual, job and employer 
attributes: temporary contracts are related, ceteris paribus, with a negative wage 
differential of about 10 per cent (Jimeno and Toharia, 2003; Hernanz, 2003). Davia 
and Hernanz (2004) present a more detailed analysis applying an Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition to know the determinants of this differential (considering that both 
groups of workers have different characteristics). This analysis shows that temporary 
workers earn less than workers with an open-ended contract mainly because of 
differences in their characteristics and because they are selected in different contract 
types due to their characteristics. Therefore, the selection of workers with open-
ended contracts in ‘good’ jobs and workers with temporary contracts in ‘bad’ jobs 
has a key role explaining wage differentials against temporary workers. 
 Finally, regarding other key (macroeconomic) variables such as labour 
productivity, some authors (for instance, Andrés et al., 2009) stress that temporary 
contracts decreases productivity in the long-term. When the use of temporary 
contracts extends throughout the economy, firms will have less incentives to select 
good workers (as they can be easily and rapidly replaced) and spend fewer resources 
in training (Albert et al., 2005). The result is a decrease in aggregate productivity, 
which fits with the Spanish experience in the last decade. 
 Nevertheless, the negative effects on productivity have only been stressed 
from the mid-1990s. Before that date, the huge increase in employment creation just 
after 1984 (in the period 1985-1991) eliminated most critical assessments of the 
labour market reform at the margin easing temporary contracts (Toharia and Malo, 
2000). Notice that, since introducing temporary contracts was a change in adjustment 
costs just before an economic expansion, the benefits of such reform were absolutely 
clear very soon, but when a crisis arrived (in 1992-1995) the Spanish society first 
experienced the ‘dark side’ of temporary contracts. This is what Boeri and Garibaldi 
(2007) has called the honeymoon effect of temporary contracts and dual labour 
markets: the cons are only clear after the pros. Under the current recession, Spanish 
society has heavily suffered the social and economic costs of a segmented labour 
market, with high employment and unemployment volatility and a blockage of the 
labour market integration of young people. 
 
 5.  Reforms affecting the linkages 
The negative aspects of the huge extension of temporary contracts were so 
evident that in the 1990s employers’ organizations, trade unions and the government 
tried to introduce legal changes to reduce temporary employment. These attempts 
were made through the Social Dialogue between employers and unions. Several 
labour market reforms have been carried out since then (in 1994, 1997, 2006, 2010-
2011 and 2012). 
The reforms in 1997 and 2006 were the outcome of agreements between 
employers and unions at national level. In the rest of them, the legal changes were 
implemented by the government after unsuccessful negotiations between employers 
and unions. The main objective of all reforms since 1994 has been to reduce the use 
of temporary contracts. The legal changes affected a wide set of aspects of labour 
contracts and labour relationships: overtime, not-regular working hours, new open-
ended contracts (with different severance payments), financial incentives for open-
ended contracts, changes in legal concepts affecting dismissals, collective 
bargaining, etc. The impact on the share of temporary employment is deemed to be 
very small (only after the 1997 reform there was a slight fall in the private sector). 
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The current recession has clearly contributed to reduce the temporary employment 
rate as a consequence of the fast and huge employment adjustment. 
The incentive for using temporary contracts is really strong due to the existence 
of a wide gap in severance payments between temporary and open-ended contracts 
(which fostered the segmentation of jobs within firms, as we have argued 
previously). However, there are other additional factors which reinforce the 
prevalence of a segmented labour market, as the lack of incentives to use alternative 
adjustments to employment in terms of wages and/or working hours and a relevant 
inertia for firms at the individual level to keep on using a well-known flexible 
employment instead of other types of adjustment. Therefore, the final outcome is a 
combination of flexibility for firms with relevant side negative results for some 
workers (especially low-skilled workers, young people and immigrants) and even for 
the whole economy (low aggregate productivity). 
The two most recent reforms of the Spanish labour market have been 
implemented in the mid-2010 and in February 2012. Both reforms have been passed 
under the pressure of the extremely poor labour outcomes in the current recession. 
With different intensity in their legal changes and with different ideological 
perspectives, both reforms have focused on eliminating distortions in the dismissal 
procedure in order to reduce the firing costs gap between open-ended and temporary 
contracts, jointly with changes in collective bargaining in order to promote 
adjustments in wages, working hours and, in general, working conditions, to 
decrease employment volatility. Both reforms were implemented after unsuccessful 
negotiations between the main employers’ organization (CEOE) and unions (UGT 
and CCOO). Therefore, these two labour market reforms have been designed out of 
the tradition of Social Dialogue existing in Spain since the beginning of the 
democratic system at the end of the 1970s. 
Focusing on the last reform implemented in 2012, the main changes have to do 
with dismissals and collective bargaining.
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 Changes on dismissals are related to a 
(supposedly) clearer definition of dismissals on economic grounds in order to make 
the severance payment for fair dismissals the new reference for future dismissals (20 
wage days per seniority year). In addition, unfair severance payment has been 
reduced for all open-ended contracts (from 45 to 33 wage days per seniority year). 
The new changes in collective bargaining regulation are intended to provide more 
internal flexibility to the firm. In other words, these changes would help employers 
to adapt wages and working hours to the business cycle. If this new regulation is 
effective, a relevant incentive to use temporary contracts would have disappeared in 
the next future and, therefore, firms would not be so dependent upon dismissals and 
end of contracts to adjust to bad times. This implies that the reform (if effective) 
might decrease the duality of the Spanish labour market. But it will take time 
because segmentation by contract type is deeply rooted into the segmentation of jobs 
within firms (which will only change at a relatively slow pace). 
Due to the short time span after the implementation of the reform, the empirical 
evidence is very limited. However, the few available data (Malo, 2012b) show that 
temporary employment is mainly affected by the recession not by the legal changes. 
As for dismissals, some data show that the distorted use of the dismissal regulation is 
slowly decreasing but at the same time a relevant increase in cases arriving to the 
labour courts has been observed. Thus, it seems that the current legislation is posing 
 
26
 See, for instance, Malo (2012a) for a description of the main changes in dismissals and 
collective bargaining implemented in the 2012 labour market reform. 
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relevant problems of interpretation about the limits of (and how to apply) the new 
definition of economic grounds for dismissals. Just after launching the reform in 
February 2012 there was an increase in workers affected by collective dismissals. 
Presumably, some firms were waiting for a more favourable legislation (especially 
on that point regarding the elimination of previous administrative authorization in 
collective dismissals), but it is hard to judge whether the increase in dismissals is 
related to a more lenient legislation on firing costs or to a new dip of the current 
recession (Malo, 2012b). 
On the other hand, although the evolution of employment has been negative in 
2012, it has been more closely associated with the destruction of employment in the 
public sector (as a consequence of the adjustment in the public budget in order to 
meet the objectives of the fiscal deficit) than directly linked to the fall in firing costs 
affecting the private sector. Although the 2012 reform has also alleviated 
bureaucratic requirements to reduce employment in the public sector, the most 
relevant part of the this adjustment has been related to temporary contracts (as Figure 
6 shows, the share of temporary employment in the public sector has diminished 
around 3-4 percentage points for men and women). 
 
6. Policy conclusions 
In Spain, the extension of labour market segmentation is associated with a 
rather ‘small’ legal change easing temporary contracts in 1984. The gap in firing 
costs with respect to open-ended contracts (widened by a strategic use of dismissal 
legislation) and the historical context fuelled temporary contracts as the main form 
of flexibility for firms. The introduction and wide use of temporary contracts 
probably helped reinforce the structure of jobs, creating relevant incentives for the 
maintenance of the segmentation, in particular in large firms. 
The impacts of this segmentation have been diverse. We can mention the huge 
volatility of employment and unemployment and the negative consequences on the 
labour market integration of young people, low-skilled workers and immigrants. 
Even if we consider that a ‘temporary contracts trap’ is not applicable to all 
individuals starting their working trajectories with a fixed-term contract, it is worth 
noting that low-skilled workers suffer high temporary employment rates during their 
whole working careers and that a high level of transitions into and out from 
employment has been relatively frequent in the 2000s (see Box 2). Although workers 
with secondary and tertiary education exhibit a substantially decline of their share of 
temporary employment when they are 30-35 year-old, this type of flexibility affects 
the postponement of emancipation, family formation and childbearing. Negative 
externalities on the whole economy have also been noted, such as low training 
incentives and low productivity. 
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Box 2   Is there a ‘temporary contracts trap’ in Spain? 
A key issue when analysing segmented labour markets is whether workers in ‘bad’ jobs are 
permanently trapped in this type of jobs or they transit to better jobs in the same or other firm. 
Most part of the literature on temporary jobs as ‘dead ends’ or ‘stepping stones’ mainly focus 
on short-term transitions. However, short-term information is only limitedly useful. The 
research based on long-term (longitudinal) data shows that temporary contracts have become 
more frequent at older ages, but in general one cannot talk of a sort of long-term trap. 
Nevertheless, some specific groups suffer much higher risks to be in temporary contracts for 
very long time. 
The average age of temporary workers have increased at a relatively low pace. For 
instance, from 1991 to 2004 it increased from 29-30 years to 33 years, i.e. around 3 years (on 
average) in 14 years. If one examines the evolution of birth cohorts, the finding is that the 
presence of people holding temporary contracts decreases with age. Anyway, around 10-15 
per cent of the population of each birth cohort has a temporary contract when they are 35 year-
old or older. Furthermore, there are substantial differences by educational level, as the 
proportion of people holding temporary contracts for the same age is much higher in the case 
of low educated individuals. 
Micro-data from administrative databases show that recurrence in temporary contracts 
(considering time periods from 6 to 8 years) is relevant: around one third of the workforce 
who are first observed with a temporary contract rotate in this type of contracts, and even 
when they obtain an open-ended contract it is unstable. This group is the one potentially 
affected by a temporary contracts trap. The characteristics of these people are the following: 
they are younger (below 30 years), have low educational level and work usually in industries 
where temporary contracts are relatively more frequent (construction for males and tourism, 
public administration and health services for females). There is also a relevant geographical 
concentration in the south of Spain (mainly, Andalusia and Extremadura, regions with 
relatively higher unemployment rates too). No clear link of this trap with being hired through a 
temporary work agency is detected; in fact, the penetration rate of these agencies is lower in 
regions with a higher use of temporary contracts (as in Andalusia, for instance). 
Sources: Toharia and Cebrián (2007) and Malo and Cueto (2013). 
 
The answers to these problems have been twofold: on one hand, changing the 
regulation of temporary and open-ended contracts; on the other hand, financial 
incentives to promote permanent employment. The latter was the key element of the 
reforms launched in 1997 and 2006. They reduced the aggregate temporary 
employment rate in the private sector, but their effects were not ‘large’ (the problem 
of segmentation remained). Changing the regulation of open-ended contracts (the 
amount of severance payments and the definitions of dismissals on economic 
grounds) was the main strategy in 1994, 2010 and 2012. These legal changes tried to 
promote the use of open-ended contracts by reducing the gap in firing costs with 
respect to temporary contracts. 
By analysing the gross flows by dismissal types, the limited empirical evidence 
available shows that the distorted use of dismissal legislation seems to be decreasing. 
However, even a hypothetical total closing of the firing costs gap would not create 
enough incentives for undoing the existing segmentation of jobs. The decline of the 
aggregate share of temporary employment would be slow even if the 2012 labour 
market reform is fully effective and fast eliminating the distortion of the practical use 
of the dismissal legislation. Unfortunately, there are uncertainties with the new legal 
rules, many of them unavoidable, since the legal change is wide, highly relevant and 
needs judiciary interpretation in many cases. 
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Therefore, even if one considers that closing the gap of firing costs goes now in 
the right direction, additional measures should be designed in order to protect those 
workers more affected by the segmentation of jobs and to speed the dismantling of 
this segmentation. 
First, protective measures should focus on the three groups more negatively 
affected by segmentation: young people, low-skilled workers and immigrants. For 
the former, active labour market policies are crucial to increase their probability of 
leaving unemployment. Thus, the recent cut of the public budget for active 
programmes is alarming, even if one takes into account that it is intended to help 
reduce the public deficit. Regarding low-skilled workers, active policies (in 
particular, training) are relevant but they also need enough income protection for 
their frequent transitions into and out of employment. An articulation between active 
and passive measures would be extremely useful for this group since they probably 
suffer more intensively the negative consequences of segmentation as their 
probability of transition towards stable jobs are low. Finally, in the case of 
immigrants, the focus should be partly on the role they play in the hidden economy, 
promoting their participation in the regular economy in order to have full access to 
the benefits related to Social Security contributions. Effective measures against the 
hidden economy and control of firms using irregular workers are complementary 
strategies of the more usual active labour market policies. 
The unsuccessful results of the social dialogue to design comprehensive labour 
market reforms since the beginning of the current recession are worrisome. The main 
unions and employers’ organizations have agreed on some issues, but the old role of 
social dialogue in promoting deep and enduring changes in the labour regulation 
seems to have been left aside. Not only the last legal regulation reforms have been 
implemented unilaterally by the government, but the rules governing collective 
bargaining have been altered without the agreement of unions and employers. As 
new legislation is always connected with uncertainties about how to use the new 
rules, social dialogue is potentially an interesting way to facilitate the 
implementation of labour market reforms. Unions and employers’ organizations 
should explore new and innovative ways to rebuild social dialogue at the highest 
level but also at the day-to-day level within firms in order to deter the segmentation 
of the labour market and to alleviate their negative consequences on the welfare of 
the weakest groups of workers. 
We have characterized the segmentation of the Spanish labour market as a sort 
of ‘Doeringer-Piore’ segmentation, that is, mainly related to the employers’ 
decisions on the organization of jobs (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). This segmentation 
is mainly visible through the existing contract arrangements: temporary contracts for 
‘bad’ jobs and open-ended contracts for ‘good’ jobs. Furthermore, fixed-term 
contracts are also used as a sort of extended probationary period for almost any type 
of job (even for ‘good’ jobs). This characterization is useful to understand the 
eventual impact of some ‘drastic’ proposals to eliminate segmentation. In the 
Spanish debate about how to tackle this dual labour market, some academic 
researchers have recommended the implementation of a ‘single contract’ (see, for 
instance, Bentolila et al., 2008, or Costain et al., 2010). Although there are different 
versions of this idea, all of them focus on a new contract considered as open-ended 
with increasing severance payments with tenure. Notice that the proposal consists of 
eliminating any relevant gap in firing costs, leaving only relatively small marginal 
increases related with tenure. The goal would be to eliminate the incentives for the 
rotation of workers in the same jobs exclusively related to the wider gap in firing 
costs when the firm considers rehiring a temporary worker with an open-ended 
contract. 
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At first sight, this innovative type of contract would be able to combat the use 
of temporary contracts as an extended probationary period (mainly in ‘good’ jobs). 
Therefore, it would be useful for high-skilled workers with better prospects in the 
labour market, shortening their stabilization period and decreasing the social costs of 
the current delay until employment security is reached. However, as ‘bad’ jobs are 
used as a buffer by the firm against business cycle, it is not clear how having a single 
contract would decrease the rotation of workers in ‘bad’ jobs. These workers would 
have low seniority anyway; thus, their severance payments would be relatively low 
and its dismissal cheap. For this group, the incentives created by the single contract 
thanks to the smoothing increase in severance payments would not be really useful. 
On the other hand, being hired as civil servant or under an open-ended contract in 
the Public Administration depends on exams to prove qualifications and guarantee 
equal opportunities. The only way to set out a single contract in this sector would be 
to apply these types of exam for all jobs, which is not feasible under the current 
procedures of all Spanish public administrations. Therefore, additional legal changes 
would be necessary to eliminate duality in the Public Administration using the single 
contract. 
Other options, as a ‘mixed’ Austrian system for severance payments have also 
been considered. The severance pay system launched in Austria in 2003 consists of 
replacing severance payments by severance accounts. Employers contribute to these 
accounts on a monthly basis. In this way, the dismissal costs are anticipated and 
employers have not to pay in case of dismissal, but workers ask for the 
reimbursement of these employers’ contributions. In case of voluntary or involuntary 
mobility to other employer, contributions accumulate, as the worker can delay the 
reimbursement even until retirement. In fact, this system was originally designed to 
be an additional pillar for the pensions system. A problem of the Austrian system is 
that the marginal cost of an additional dismissal for the firm is null. Considering the 
Spanish case, this feature would provide strong incentives for relatively large 
collective dismissals amidst the current recession. Therefore, the discussion among 
experts and labour practitioners focused mainly on a mixed Austrian system, 
including the above contributions but also a relatively small ‘traditional’ severance 
payment just after the dismissal (Malo and González-Sánchez, 2010). Nevertheless, 
the implementation of this system was discharged in 2011 by an experts group 
created by the government, trade unions and employers’ organizations. The main 
reason was that the new contribution would increase labour costs and require re-
arranging all employers’ contributions, which was considered extremely difficult 
during the recession and probably only feasible in a future expansionary period. In 
fact, some legal changes implemented in 2010 as a starting point for a mixed 
Austrian system (Malo, 2011b) were fully eliminated by the labour market reform 
launched in 2012. 
What other reforms would be desirable to fight segmentation? It is easy for 
experts to propose ‘drastic’ or ‘deep’ changes in the legal regulation of the labour 
market. Nevertheless, at this moment (March 2013) the Spanish society exhibits a 
sort of fatigue or discouragement about labour market reforms. In addition to a very 
negative economic situation and with other key economic reforms not totally 
finished (as the one of the financial system), it would be wiser to complete and to 
qualify the current reform. Nowadays, the main problem has to do with employment, 
not with segmentation. However, fostering employment is not as easy as simply 
changing the legal regulation. A substantial part of the changes in the two latest 
labour market reforms has affected the system of collective bargaining, 
implementing modifications with the aim of making adjustment patterns (wages and 
hours, and not only employment) easier to firms. But, since these legal changes were 
not agreed by unions and employers’ organizations, a relevant resilience will exist 
which will act jointly with the learning costs linked to any change in the basic rules. 
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Alleviating measures for the most affected groups of workers (low-skilled 
people, young workers, long-term unemployed) must probably be implemented in 
the short-term. But only an improvement in growth might really increase 
employment and foster hires under the new set of legal rules (which should mitigate 
the current segmentation by contract types). To help in such improvement, crucial 
measures should be the softening of austerity policies through a less strict calendar 
for public deficit reduction and a definitive solution to the weakness of the financial 
system. For both measures, collaboration and agreement with the rest of countries of 
the Eurozone are imperative. 
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Table 1 Estimates of a logit model on the individual probability of having job tenure of less than one 
year or less than five years. LFS (1987-2003) 
 Job tenure < 1 year Job tenure < 5 years 
 Coeff. S.E. Sign. Coeff. S. E. Sign. 
Gender       
Woman 0.135 0.011 *** 0.084 0.009 *** 
Age       
16-24 0.600 0.012 *** 0.525 0.011 *** 
25-34 - - - - - - 
35-49 -0.538 0.010 *** -0.880 0.008 *** 
50-64 -0.951 0.014 *** -1.394 0.011 *** 
Level of education       
Less than primary 0.148 0.022 *** -0.073 0.018 *** 
Primary -0.088 0.017 *** -0.267 0.013 *** 
Compulsory secondary -0.227 0.016 *** -0.336 0.013 *** 
Post-compulsory secondary -0.210 0.017 *** -0.288 0.013 *** 
Vocational training -0.154 0.016 *** -0.211 0.013 *** 
University degree - - - - - - 
Institutional sector       
Public - - - - - - 
Private 0.453 0.015 *** 0.554 0.011 *** 
Types of contract       
Open-ended - - - - - - 
Fixed-term 3.428 0.008 *** 2.567 0.007 *** 
Occupation       
White-collar high-skilled occ. - - - - - - 
White-collar low-skilled occ. 0.124 0.014 *** 0.039 0.011 *** 
Blue-collar high-skilled occ. 0.134 0.016 *** 0.110 0.013 *** 
Blue-collar low-skilled occ. 0.360 0.015 *** 0.344 0.012 *** 
Year       
1987-1991 - - - - - - 
1992-1994 0.226 0.014 *** 0.068 0.011 *** 
1995-2003 0.452 0.021 *** 0.055 0.007 *** 
Constant -4.444 0.063 *** -1.256 0.051 *** 
Log-likelihood -251,772.6 -349,667.6 
Source: Arranz and García-Serrano (2007). Estimations also include controls for individual and job attributes (household position, marital 
status, working hours, region and sector of economic activity), economic conditions (regional unemployment rate) and other aggregate 
variables (degree of openness of the economy measured by the proportion of exports over the GDP). The base category is a man, aged 25-
34, married, head of the household, with a university degree, working in the public sector, holding an open-ended contract, working more 
than 30 hours and living in Andalucía. (*) indicates that the corresponding coefficient is statistically significant at 1 per cent. 
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Table 2 Estimated trend coefficients for the aggregate share of workers with job tenure of less than one year or 
less than five years using different sets of controls. LFS (1987-2003) 
 Job tenure < 1 year Job tenure < 5 years 
 Characteristics (1) (1) + Cycle Characteristics (1) (1) + Cycle 
 Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. Coeff. S. E. 
Total 0.0067 0.0018 0.0100 0.0014 0.0049 0.0008 0.0055 0.0009 
Gender         
 Men 0.0060 0.0018 0.0095 0.0015 0.0054 0.0008 0.0059 0.0009 
 Women 0.0069 0.0017 0.0099 0.0015 0.0024 0.0008 0.0029 0.0009 
Age         
 16-24 0.0131 0.0038 0.0211 0.0026 0.0057 0.0019 0.0091 0.0011 
 25-34 0.0131 0.0026 0.0183 0.0019 0.0116 0.0018 0.0134 0.0013 
 35-49 0.0057 0.0009 0.0076 0.0006 0.0058 0.0005 0.0058 0.0005 
 50-64 0.0023 0.0008 0.0038 0.0007 0.0024 0.0006 0.0027 0.0006 
Occupation         
 WCHS 0.0063 0.0008 0.0076 0.0008 0.0033 0.0005 0.0029 0.0008 
 WCLS 0.0082 0.0017 0.0115 0.0013 0.0050 0.0012 0.0055 0.0011 
 BCHS 0.0054 0.0023 0.0095 0.0019 0.0062 0.0016 0.0069 0.0012 
 BCLS 0.0106 0.0024 0.0153 0.0018 0.0078 0.0014 0.0093 0.0010 
Institutional sector         
 Public 0.0035 0.0006 0.0034 0.0007 -0.0013 0.0009 -0.0018 0.0011 
 Private 0.0072 0.0023 0.0120 0.0018 0.0062 0.0016 0.0076 0.0011 
Types of contract         
 Open-ended 0.0011 0.0007 0.0002 0.0007 0.0009 0.0014 -0.0020 0.0008 
 Fixed-term 0.0084 0.0034 0.0159 0.0020 0.0032 0.0019 0.0072 0.0011 
Level of education         
 Less than primary 0.0085 0.0016 0.0113 0.0015 0.0082 0.0010 0.0088 0.0011 
 Primary 0.0062 0.0018 0.0099 0.0014 0.0055 0.0009 0.0066 0.0010 
 Compulsory 
secondary 
0.0051 0.0026 0.0102 0.0020 0.0019 0.0011 0.0032 0.0011 
 Post-compulsory sec. 0.0070 0.0011 0.0090 0.0010 0.0021 0.0006 0.0017 0.0009 
 Vocational training 0.0036 0.002 0.0072 0.0017 -0.0008 0.0006 -0.0010 0.0008 
 University degree 0.0080 0.0007 0.0086 0.0008 0.0035 0.0006 0.0023 0.0006 
Source: Arranz and García-Serrano (2007). The estimation procedure consists of two steps. In the first step, all available cross sections of the LFS are 
pooled and a logit model is estimated on the probability of belonging to each tenure category conditional on a set of year dummies, personal 
characteristics (gender, age, marital status, educational attainment, etc.) and job controls (occupation, type of contract, institutional sector, industry, 
etc.). Using the calendar year coefficients, year-specific probabilities are then calculated (the logit function is evaluated at the observed mean of the 
other covariates). In the second step of the estimation, these probabilities are regressed on a linear time trend and a cyclical control (unemployment 
rate) using ordinary least squares. Moreover, as the error term in the second step regression may be heteroskedastic because errors are subject to 
small sample bias (17 observations for the 17 year specific probabilities), consistent standard errors estimates are provided using the jackknife method 
in those regressions where the error term is heteroskedastic. The first column for each tenure category shows the estimated trends in the regression-
adjusted probabilities without controlling for the cyclical component (unemployment rate), which is incorporated in the second column. The coefficients 
can be read either as yearly unit changes or as yearly percentage changes if we multiply them by 100. 
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Table 3 Means of objective indicators on working conditions by type of contract and job tenure, and proportion 
of workers with high probability to leave their jobs. ECVT (2001) 
 Total Open-ended Fixed-term 
 
Open-
ended 
Fixed-
term 
<18 
months 
18-42 
months 
>42 
months 
<18 
months 
18-42 
months 
>42 
months 
Indicators         
Working  life quality 3.97 3.42 4.17 3.76 3.98 3.37 3.70 3.30 
General working conditions 6.14 6.03 6.47 5.87 6.15 6.10 5.91 5.86 
Pride 6.81 5.55 6.38 6.43 6.96 5.37 5.69 6.09 
No alienation 8.15 6.77 7.92 7.96 8.23 6.52 7.29 7.18 
Participation 4.36 3.13 4.34 4.13 4.41 2.90 3.66 3.46 
Integration 2.83 1.74 2.44 2.66 2.93 1.60 2.04 1.99 
Autonomy 4.56 3.22 4.50 4.13 4.65 2.95 3.69 3.77 
         
% Leaving within one year 4.4 26.1 9.1 7.7 3.1 31.8 20.5 11.5 
Reasons (distrib.)         
End/Layoff 7.8 52.9 24.1 9.1 0.0 54.1 43.9 56.0 
Job offer 35.9 20.6 37.9 57.6 24.2 19.6 26.8 20.0 
Others 56.3 26.5 37.8 33.3 75.8 26.3 29.3 24.0 
Source: García-Serrano (2004). Each indicator combines information from a set of variables. All the variables included in the indicators are considered 
equally important and then given a value of one. Indicators are normalized in order to range from 0 to 10. See the appendix of García-Serrano (2004) 
for a description.  
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Table 4  Estimates of ordered logistic models on objective indicators of working conditions. ECVT (2001) 
 
Working life 
quality 
General working 
conditions 
Pride No alienation Participation Integration Autonomy 
 Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. Coeff. Sig. 
Contract and tenure               
 Temporary and <18 months -0.299 ** -0.156  -0.371 ** -0.638 ** -0.604 ** -0.404 ** -0.673 ** 
 Temporary and 18-42 months -0.177  -0.148  -0.307  -0.183  -0.228  -0.051  -0.166  
 Temporary and >42 months -0.518 ** -0.465 ** -0.218 * -0.281  -0.327 * -0.034  -0.220  
 Permanent and <18 months -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
 Permanent and 18-42 months -0.200  -0.483 ** 0.145  0.120  -0.054  0.223  -0.071  
 Permanent and >42 months -0.248 * -0.332 ** 0.096  0.166  -0.130  0.175  -0.069  
Firm size               
 1-49 workers -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
 50-249 workers -0.202 ** -0.366 ** -0.215 ** -0.149  -0.111  -0.097  -0.265 ** 
 250-999 workers -0.398 ** -0.589 ** -0.245 * -0.174  -0.091  0.047  -0.156  
 >1000 workers -0.663 ** -0.647 ** -0.221 * -0.346 ** -0.253 ** -0.241 ** -0.400 ** 
Occupations               
 White-collar high-skilled occ.  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
 White-collar low-skilled occ. -0.739 ** -0.936 ** -0.271 ** -0.762 ** -0.542 ** -0.396 ** -0.840 ** 
 Blue-collar high-skilled occ. -0.690 ** -1.404 ** -0.591 ** -1.056 ** -0.871 ** -0.737 ** -1.353 ** 
 Blue-collar low-skilled occ. -0.917 ** -1.331 ** -0.860 ** -1.613 ** -1.193 ** -0.880 ** -1.590 ** 
Gender               
 Men -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
 Women -0.037  0.291 ** -0.226 ** -0.278 ** -0.130  -0.192 ** -0.375 ** 
Age               
 16-24 -  -  -  -  -  -  -  
 25-34 -0.201  -0.273 ** 0.004  0.109  0.101  -0.102  0.069  
 35-44 -0.125  -0.189  -0.024  0.063 ** 0.095  -0.051  0.030  
 45-54 0.036  0.012  0.191  0.322 ** 0.199  -0.077  0.100  
 55+ 0.286  0.159 * 0.184  0.446 ** 0.267  0.050  0.281  
Log likelihood -6,281.7 -7,586.8 -6,511.8 -7,086.6 -7,051.3 -6,763.6 -8,499.7 
N 4,059 4,059 4,059 4,059 4,059 4,059 4,059 
Source: García-Serrano (2004).  The models include education, industry and regional controls, and dummies on collective bargaining, working hours and marital status as well. Asterisks indicate significance at 1 per cent (**) 
and 5 per cent (*), respectively. 
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Table 5  Proportion of workers participating in training activities and working in employers providing training, 
by several variables. ECVT (2002-2010) 
 
% workers 
participating in 
training 
% workers in 
employers proving 
training 
Conditional probability 
of participating in firm-
providing training 
 2002-2004 2006-2010 2002-2004 2006-2010 2002-2004 2006-2010 
TOTAL 22.4 38.3 36.5 50.3 61.4 76.0 
Institutional sector       
 Public sector 37.4 49.6 62.3 65.9 60.1 75.3 
 Private sector 18.7 34.6 30.0 45.4 62.0 76.2 
Sector of activity       
 Agriculture 8.8 17.6 12.9 24.3 68.5 72.5 
 Industry 23.3 36.8 50.9 50.2 45.7 73.1 
 Construction 12.4 32.4 19.9 41.9 62.5 76.5 
 Wholesale and retail trade 20.2 33.5 31.0 43.7 65.4 76.8 
 Hotels, restaurants 10.9 23.5 20.4 30.7 53.6 75.8 
 Transport, communications 25.9 36.8 39.2 49.7 66.1 73.9 
 Financial intermediation 48.5 63.8 70.0 76.9 69.1 83.3 
 Business, real state, renting 21.9 33.8 33.6 44.9 65.6 75.5 
 Public Adm., Social 
Security 
34.8 49.4 60.5 67.4 57.2 73.5 
 Ed cation 39.6 55.9 62.1 69.8 63.9 80.0 
 Health and social services 31.9 49.6 55.5 65.5 57.6 75.7 
 Other social and personal 
serv. 
18.6 33.0 31.2 44.3 59.8 74.7 
 Housing 1.6 2.5 2.4 3.6 72.2 72.8 
Employer size       
 Less than 10 employees 9.2 18.8 14.2 25.0 65.3 74.7 
 10-49 employees 18.8 31.7 30.5 41.9 61.4 75.6 
 50-249 employees 29.7 40.0 47.5 53.6 62.4 74.5 
 250+ employees 42.4 53.0 68.9 69.1 61.5 76.8 
Contract type       
 Open-ended contract 28.2 - 44.1 - 64.0 - 
 Fixed-term contract 12.5 - 21.5 - 58.3 - 
Gender       
 Men 23.4 - 37.2 - 63.0 - 
 Women 23.5 - 37.2 - 63.2 - 
Age       
 16-19 1.7 - 13.8 - 12.2 - 
 20-24 20.9 - 30.9 - 67.7 - 
 25-29 24.4 - 36.0 - 67.8 - 
 30-44 25.0 - 38.2 - 65.5 - 
 45-54 26.8 - 42.5 - 63.1 - 
 55-64 16.3 - 36.3 - 45.0 - 
 65+ 13.9 - 45.6 - 30.5 - 
Level of education       
 Less than primary 4.0 - 9.0 - 44.4 - 
 Primary 10.9 - 21.6 - 50.4 - 
 Secondary 22.2 - 35.4 - 62.6 - 
 University degree 41.0 - 59.8 - 68.6 - 
Note: figures are averages for two periods (2002-2004 and 2006-2010). The ECVT suffered a significant change in the 
methodology in 2006. It was not conducted in 2005. Since 2004, data on training are available only for employer attributes. 
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Table 6   Estimates of univariate probit and heckprobit models on the probability of participating in firm-provided 
training. ECVT (2001) 
 Univariate probit Bivariate probit 
    
Probability of being 
employed in a training 
firm 
Probability of being 
chosen to participate in 
training 
 Coef. z Sig. Coef. z Sig. Coef. z Sig. 
Constant -1.44 -5.70 ** -1.57 -8.11 ** -0.25 -0.31  
Type of contract (Permanent)          
 Training and apprenticeship 
contract 
0.08 0.49  -   -0.26 -1.22  
 Fixed-term contract -0.29 -4.26 ** -   -0.23 -2.30 * 
Employer size (Less than 10)          
 10-25 workers 0.24 3.10 ** 0.28 3.99 ** 0.06 0.45  
 26-49 workers 0.58 6.88 ** 0.63 8.05 ** 0.35 2.07 * 
 50-99 workers 0.60 6.73 ** 0.72 8.67 ** 0.28 1.33  
 99-249 workers 0.79 8.71 ** 0.87 10.36 ** 0.49 2.43 * 
 250-499 workers 0.89 8.24 ** 1.07 10.39 ** 0.58 2.37 * 
 500-999 workers 1.01 8.75 ** 1.06 9.53 ** 0.72 3.21 ** 
 1,000+ workers 0.96 11.84 ** 1.18 15.35 ** 0.71 3.12 ** 
Sector (Agriculture)          
 Construction 0.17 0.85  0.34 1.94  -0.34 -0.71  
 Mining and energy 0.85 3.49 ** 1.32 5.58 ** 0.36 0.64  
 Chemicals, rubber and plastic 0.44 2.23 * 0.83 4.53 ** 0.04 0.07  
 Machinery and equipment 0.59 2.84 ** 1.04 5.36 ** 0.16 0.31  
 Food, textiles and wood 0.22 1.12  0.55 3.15 ** -0.21 -0.44  
 Traditional services 0.37 1.95  0.70 4.14 ** 0.05 0.10  
 Productive services 0.67 3.50 ** 1.15 6.59 ** 0.37 0.73  
 Social services 0.64 3.22 ** 1.09 6.16 ** 0.52 1.08  
 Personal services 0.25 1.15  0.39 1.98 * 0.08 0.16  
 Public services 0.60 2.90 ** 1.01 5.27 ** 0.32 0.65  
Institutional sector (Public)          
 Private -0.11 -1.35  -0.36 -4.41 ** -0.08 -0.58  
Tenure (<1 year)          
 1-3 years 0.41 4.53 ** -   0.23 1.71  
 4-6 years 0.48 4.42 ** -   0.25 1.63  
 7-10 years 0.65 5.64 ** -   0.41 2.29 * 
 11-20 years 0.59 5.61 ** -   0.29 1.91  
 >20 years 0.54 4.71 ** -   0.14 0.89  
Working time (Full-time)          
 Part-time -0.18 -2.07 * -   -0.12 -0.99  
Occupation (WCHS)          
 White-collar low-skilled occ. -0.19 -2.60 ** -   -0.23 -2.12 * 
 Blue-collar high-skilled occ. -0.52 -5.78 ** -   -0.35 -2.51 * 
 Blue-collar low-skilled occ. -0.59 -7.51 ** -   -0.45 -2.98 ** 
Gender (Men)          
 Women -0.16 -2.90 ** -   -0.13 -1.68  
Education (Compulsory)          
 Secondary 0.18 2.92 ** -   0.13 1.58  
 University degree 0.22 2.73 ** -   0.08 0.79  
Age (16-24 years)          
 25-29 years -0.07 -0.68  -   -0.11 -0.82  
 30-44 years -0.07 -0.81  -   -0.16 -1.19  
 45-54 years -0.08 -0.74  -   -0.04 -0.27  
 55-64 years -0.28 -2.31 * -   -0.26 -1.43  
    0.79     
Log-likelihood -2,016.9  -2,851.1     
Observations 4,183  4,183  1,624  
Source: Albert et al. (2005). Controls for regions (17) were also included in the estimations. Asterisks indicate significance at 1 per cent (**) and 5 (*) 
per cent, respectively.  LR test of independence (=0): 2(1) =3.88; Prob>2=0.049. 
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Table 7    Average level of satisfaction with the job, by several variables. ECVT (2002-2010)  
 2002-2004 2006-2010 
Total 6.8 7.3 
Age   
 16-24 6.8 7.3 
 25-29 6.7 7.2 
 30-44 6.7 7.3 
 45-54 6.9 7.3 
 55+ 7.0 7.4 
Level of education   
 Less than primary 6.4 7.0 
 Primary 6.6 7.2 
 Compulsory secondary 6.8 7.2 
 Post-compulsory secondary 6.8 7.3 
 Vocational training 6.8 7.4 
 University degree 7.0 7.5 
Sector of activity   
 Agriculture and fishing 6.2 6.7 
 Industry 6.4 7.2 
 Construction 6.8 7.2 
 Wholesale and retail trade 6.8 7.3 
 Hotels and restaurants 6.6 7.1 
 Transport 6.6 7.1 
 Information, communications, financial intermediation and renting 7.2 7.4 
 Real state; professional, technical and administrative activities 6.6 7.2 
 Public Administration and Social Security 7.1 7.5 
 Education 7.4 7.8 
 Health and social services 7.0 7.5 
 Artistic activities. leisure and other services 7.1 7.6 
 Domestic services  5.8 7.0 
Contract type   
 Open-ended contract - 7.4 
 Fixed-term contract - 7.0 
Employer size   
 Less than 11 employees - 7.3 
 11-50 employees - 7.2 
 51-249 employees - 7.2 
 250 or more employees - 7.3 
Job tenure   
 Less than 3 years - 7.2 
 3-5 years - 7.3 
 6-10 years - 7.4 
 11-20 years - 7.3 
 More than 20 years - 7.3 
Monthly earnings   
 Less than 600 euros - 6.8 
 600-1,000 euros - 7.0 
 1,001-1,200 euros - 7.3 
 1.201-1,600 euros - 7.4 
 1,601-2,100 euros - 7.5 
 2,101-3,000 euros - 7.7 
 More than 3,000 euros - 7.9 
Note: figures are averages for two periods (2002-2004 and 2006-2010). The ECVT suffered a significant change in the methodology in 2006. It was 
not conducted in 2005. Before 2006, data on satisfaction were available only for some characteristics (age, level of education, sector of activity and 
occupation). 
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Table 8    Estimates of an ordered probit regression on job satisfaction. ECVT (2000-2003) 
 Coeff. Std. error z-statistic 
Gender    
 Man - - - 
 Woman 0.103 0.024 4.32 
Level of education    
 Less than compulsory secondary - - - 
 Compulsory secondary -0.075 0.031 -2.47 
 Post-compulsory secondary -0.257 0.039 -6.57 
 Vocational training -0.158 0.034 -4.59 
 University degree -0.319 0.042 -7.63 
Occupation    
 White-collar high-skilled -0.175 0.038 -4.65 
 White-collar low-skilled -0.126 0.033 -3.86 
 Blue-collar high-skilled -0.003 0.031 -0.09 
 Blue-collar low-skilled - - - 
Type of contract    
 Permanent - - - 
 Fixed-term -0.047 0.025 -1.91 
Net monthly wage (euros)    
 <450 - - - 
 450-600 0.154 0.057 2.69 
 600-900 0.182 0.055 3.34 
 900-1,200 0.274 0.058 4.75 
 1,200-2,400 0.278 0.062 4.53 
 >2,400 0.310 0.073 4.23 
 No answer 0.299 0.060 4.97 
Institutional sector    
 Public - - - 
 Private -0.103 0.038 -2.69 
Employer size    
 1-9 workers - - - 
 10-49 workers 0.045 0.027 1.69 
 50-99 workers 0.020 0.038 0.51 
 100-499 workers 0.085 0.034 2.48 
 500+ workers 0.028 0.034 0.81 
Collective bargaining    
 External (sectoral/regional-level) - - - 
 Internal (firm/plant-level) 0.029 0.021 1.40 
Union affiliation    
 No - - - 
 Yes -0.027 0.025 -1.11 
LR Chi2(70)  4,397.4  
Prob > Chi2  0.000  
Log likelihood  -21,818.0  
Observations  12,241  
Source: García-Serrano (2009). The model includes controls on marital status, number of children in the household, region, size of 
the municipality, labour market experience (and squared), type of job, working hours, training status of worker and employer, sector 
of activity and indicators of working conditions.  
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Appendix27  
 
Table A1   Monetary costs, requirements and procedures for dismissals in Spain before the labour market reform of 
February 2012 (synthesis) 
  
Monetary Costs 
(Number of days wages per year 
worked  in the firm) 
Procedures (requirements and time periods) 
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Fair: 0. 
Unfair: 45 (maximum: 42 months 
of salary). 
* Letter explaining dismissal reasons. 
* Advance notice is not required. 
* ‘Express dismissal’. After Act 45/2002, when the 
employer accepts the dismissal as unfair in 48 hours after 
presenting the dismissal letter and provides the worker 
with severance payment for unfair dismissal, the employer 
will not have to pay any additional amount, even if the 
worker files a successful suit for unfair dismissal. 
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- Fair: 20 (max. 12 months of 
salary). 
- Unfair:  
* Ordinary open-ended contracts: 
45 (max. 42 months of salary). 
* Open-ended contracts for 
employment promotion (created in 
1997): 33 (max. 24 months de 
salary). 
 
* Letter explaining dismissal reasons. 
* Advance notice: 15 days (Act 35/2010). The employer 
can replace the advance notice with the corresponding 
wage. 
* ‘Express dismissal’. After Act 45/2002, when the 
employer accepts the dismissal as unfair in 48 hours after 
presenting the dismissal letter and provides the worker 
with severance payment for unfair dismissal, the employer 
will not have to pay any additional amount, even if the 
worker files a successful suit for unfair dismissal. 
* Act35/2010 Act (labour market reform of 2010) 
introduced new wording for economic grounds in order to 
facilitate fair economic dismissals. 
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Minimum: 20. 
Maximum: Not fixed by law. 
 
* Definition: Dismissals on economic grounds affecting at 
least: 
- 10 workers in firms with less than 100 workers. 
- 10 per cent in firms between 100 and 300 workers. 
- 30 in firms with more than 300 workers. 
* There is a mandatory bargaining period between the firm 
and workers’ representatives (bargaining issues include 
severance payments and the number of dismissals). 
* Public Administration must give previous authorization 
to the collective dismissal (in case of agreement between 
firm and workers the authorization is straightforward). The 
firm can apply for authorization even in case of 
disagreement. 
 
 
†
 Individual economic dismissals can affect different workers at the same time below the threshold of collective 
dismissals (ERE). 
 
 
27
 Both tables of this Appendix are taken from Malo (2012a). 
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 Fair: 0. 
Unfair: 33 (maximum: 24 months 
of salary). 
* Letter explaining dismissal reasons. 
* Advance notice is not required. 
* The procedure for dismissals according to Act 45/2002 
Act (‘express dismissal’) has been abolished. 
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salary). 
- Unfair:  
* All open-ended contracts: 33 
(max. 24 months of salary). 
 
* Letter explaining dismissal reasons. 
* Advance notice: 15 days (Act 35/2010). The employer 
can replace the advance notice with the corresponding 
wage. 
* The procedure for dismissals according to Act 45/2002 
(‘express dismissal’) has been abolished. 
* The RDL 3/2012 (labour market reform of 2012) 
introduced a new and even more precise and detailed 
wording for economic grounds in order to facilitate fair 
economic dismissals. This definition includes an explicit 
threshold of 9 months of decline in firm income and sales. 
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Minimum: 20. 
Maximum: Not fixed by law. 
 
* Definition: Dismissals on economic grounds affecting at 
least: 
- 10 workers in firms with less than 100 workers. 
- 10 per cent in firms between 100 and 300 workers. 
- 30 in firms with more than 300 workers. 
* There is a mandatory bargaining period between the firm 
and workers’ representatives (bargaining issues include 
severance payments and the number of dismissals). 
* Previous authorization from Public Administration is no 
longer required. 
 
†
 Individual economic dismissals can affect different workers at the same time below the threshold of collective 
dismissals (ERE). 
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